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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three studies related to corporate governance of equity
mutual funds in a framework of relations between the three closely interrelated actors of mutual
fund industry. The mutual fund advisers, the shareholders and the mutual fund board being the
advocate of shareholders rights.
The first study analyzes the advisory fee, using a survivorship bias free data set of 176
equity funds managed by 125 different advisers. The price of professional portfolio management
provided by the mutual fund adviser depends not only on the fund characteristics but also on the
fund objective, the adviser’s portfolio related and management based decisions, and the portfolio
performance. I find that the advisers may reduce their own costs through the use of derivatives or
manipulate the actual fee contract by engaging in soft dollar agreements. Advisers actively
manage the advisory fee contracts responding to the outcome of their management decisions.
The advisory fee increases after voluntary fee reimbursement or if the adviser is not fully
reimbursed for certain services. Risk taking behavior is the main motivation behind the structure
of advisory contracts. Also, I show that non-surviving funds have higher advisory fees,
suggesting competitive fee pricing may be necessary for survival.
The second study focuses on the relation between general board characteristics,
independent director characteristics and the advisory fee which is solely an outcome of the
negotiations between the fund board and the adviser, thus a good proxy for the governance skills
of the board. I also examine the impact of SEC’s regulation change of 2000. Mutual fund
scandals that took place after the regulation change of 2000 suggested that besides the fraction of
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independent seats, the individual characteristics of the members that occupy board seats are
crucial for mutual fund board governance.
I find that boards benchmark objective average fee but not necessarily for the best interest
of shareholders. Shareholders are likely to benefit from the expertise of members with higher
tenure and finance backgrounds. Although increase in board independence is likely to contribute
to board governance, the effect of 2000 regulation change of board independence on its arguably
target group is limited. Nominating committee improves the board governance. Although the
results do not suggest that an independent chairman directly improves board governance, I find
modest evidence that the impact of an independent chairman is likely to depend on the expertise
of the member that would occupy the chairman seat.
Third study analyzes a specific tool, soft dollar arrangements using a survivorship bias
free data set of 432 equity funds managed by 129 different advisers. Soft dollar arrangements
affect all three actors of mutual fund industry. They are widely used by the advisers, have to be
monitored closely by the fund board and eventually affect the overall wealth of shareholders.
Fund advisers determine the broker base, scope of brokerage services and whether to self
produce or outsource brokerage services through soft dollar arrangements. In return,
shareholders expect to benefit from better fund performance and reduction in advisory fee. I find
that transaction execution not necessarily motivated by additional brokerage services is likely to
be responsible for high turnover. Construction of brokerage base by the adviser is not arbitrary.
Advisers ex ante construct the broker base in order to minimize the brokerage commissions and
considering ex post soft dollar arrangements. Transaction execution related services lead to less
brokerage commissions and soft dollar use while both increase if research is a consideration for
broker participation. More concentrated broker base leads to lower brokerage fee and higher soft
iv

dollar use. Results indicate that advisers enforce competition within brokerage industry for lower
cost of transaction execution. Shareholders benefit from increasing soft dollar use through
performance improvement and reduction in advisory fee. Yet, the cost of soft dollar
arrangements seems to exceed their benefit to shareholders. If the results indicate competition
within brokerage industry for lower cost of transaction execution, the undisclosed premium paid
for the additional services are likely to be responsible for this adverse effect.
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PART 1. DYNAMIC MANAGEMENT OF MUTUAL FUND ADVISORY
CONTRACTS
1.1 Introduction

Mutual funds have been displaying dramatic growth for over a decade and this dynamic
financial service industry has been getting increasing attention from the regulators, academia,
and the press. Despite this rapid growth and dynamic structure of the mutual funds industry, the
attention devoted to the advisory contracts which determines the price of the primary product,
professional portfolio management, is limited.
Optimal contracts should provide a strong link between managerial compensation and
investor welfare when there is little known by the investors about the production function linking
their objective function and manager’s objective function (Murphy 1998). Since each fund and
each adviser is unique, so the contracts should be. The advisory fee contract defines the optimal
advisory fee, the major component of the total fee; that covers solely the cost of portfolio
management, provides profit to the adviser and still attracts additional inflows. Other
components of the fund’s total fee are 12b-1 fees, which are used to compensate broker-dealers
for selling efforts, transfer agent fees, and accounting and legal expenses. Funds also charge
loads that incur when fund shares are purchased (front-end load) and redeemed (back-end load).
Coles et al (2000) argue that the optimal fee structure varies between funds. Furthermore,
Deli (2002) provides evidence implying that the fund characteristics have impact on the variation
of the advisory fee. However, the economic determinants of the advisory fee would not be
limited to the fund characteristics for couple of reasons. First, the advisory fee is not bound by
any regulation such as 12b-1 fees. Due to its largely unconstrained nature, the advisory fee will
1

depend on the contract environment (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Deli (2002)). Therefore,
market dynamics and norms are likely to affect the optimal advisory fee. Second, Tufano and
Sevick (1997) suggest that advisory contracts are largely the products of advisory firms
themselves. Therefore, the advisory fee is dependent on the adviser’s decisions. These decisions
might be directly related to portfolio management such as the use of derivatives or they might be
management decisions exogenous to cost of portfolio management such as voluntary
reimbursement of fees. The adviser is also expected to attempt to distinguish himself based on
the quality of his marginal product. Therefore, the adviser is likely to try to signal abnormal
performance as an indicator of superior management skills.
Overall, the economic determinants of the optimal advisory fee are not limited to the fund
characteristics. While the adviser takes the fund characteristics, the market norms and fund
performance given, he or she could actively manage the advisory fee through his or her own
management decisions. The adviser would consider these four set of factors while adopting an
advisory fee strategy.
In a competitive market such as mutual funds where funds are pushed to compete on the
fees, the adviser would determine the additional mark-up to advisory fee observing the market
norms and competitors’ advisory fees. This would not require a fundamental change to the cost
structure as long as the premium is high enough for the adviser. However, the competition would
limit the degree of mark-up. Hence, this would lead the adviser to attempt to find ways to reduce
the cost of portfolio management. In that case, the advisor has broadly two options. First, the
adviser may alter the portfolio management techniques or reimburse fees. Second, he or she may
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simply manipulate the fee contract in order to reduce the contractual advisory fee without
actually changing the total rent transfer from shareholders.
Using a survivorship bias free sample of 176 equity funds managed by 125 different
advisors, I investigate how the dynamic advisory fee management is associated with the
adviser’s decisions and the given factors such as fund characteristics, market norms and
performance. I find that fund characteristics have an impact on the advisory fee. The advisory fee
decreases with fund size, but increases with the adviser’s size. I find that the advisory fee is
adjusted based on the objective average. However, this strategy benefits the shareholder only
when the objective average fee declines.
Advisory fee determination is associated with both the portfolio related and the
management related decisions of the adviser. Several results support this conclusion. I find that,
the adviser successfully reduces the cost of portfolio management by using derivatives or
manipulate the advisory fee by engaging in research agreements. Also, funds that bundle the
gross administrative fee and gross advisory fee have a higher contractual advisory fee.
Contracting is further affected by ex ante voluntary fee reimbursement by the advisory firm.
Advisers do not adjust the advisory fee based on the overall number of non-reimbursed services.
However, when the non-reimbursement is examined at the individual service level, the results
indicate that advisers adjust the advisory fee based on the non-reimbursement of certain services.
Finally, not necessarily performance improvement but superior performance gives the
adviser the opportunity to successfully signal better management skills and increase the advisory
fee. Since Jensen (1968), the majority of the studies show that mutual fund managers fail to
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outperform passive benchmarks. However, superior performance is still likely to serve as a
signal of better management skills.
I also investigate the structure of the advisory contracts. The structure of the advisory fee
contract influences the total dollar amount of rent transfer from shareholders to the adviser. Over
90% of the equity mutual fund advisory contracts specify the fee as a certain percentage of net
assets. Remaining type of contracts adopt benchmark-based performance fee. I do not examine
these funds.1 Asset based advisory fee contracts either have a fixed fee rate or a scaled fee rate.
In the case of a fixed fee rate, the same percentage is applied to each additional dollar, whereas
in the case of a scaled fee structure, decreasing fee rates are applied to different brackets of fund
assets. I find that the advisory fee contracts tend to be more concave as funds grow. This result is
consistent with the risk motivation argument of Deli (2002) suggesting that a fixed fee rate
structure motivates the fund management to take on more risk since the marginal increase in the
amount of total rent for each additional dollar will be constant. Finally, I find that advisers adjust
the structure of the advisory fee contract following the non-reimbursement of services.
Section 1 discusses the variables and hypothesis. Section 2 provides information on the
data and methodology. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics, discusses empirical results, and
limitations. Section 4 concludes and suggests possible future research.

1

See Elton et al. (2003) for benchmark-based performance fees.
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1.2 Variables and Hypothesis

1.2.1 Advisory fee
Literature provides evidence that advisory contracts differ based on fund characteristics.
However, the adviser would consider different sets of factors simultaneously for the advisory fee
determination. Besides the fund characteristics, the adviser’s fee decision would be constrained
by the norms imposed by the market dynamics; influenced by the incentive to signal superior
management skills, and determined by the management decisions.

1.2.1.1 Fund specific factors
The literature provides evidence that fund size significantly affects the advisory fee.
Smaller funds and funds of smaller advisers have higher advisory fees (Deli (2002)), thus
economies of scale exists.2 Furthermore, a better informed adviser is more likely to engage in a
greater amount of information-motivated trading leading to a higher turnover rate (Ippolito
(1992), Edelen (1999), Deli (2002)). Nevertheless, it has also been suggested that a high turnover
rate could be the result of the manager’s excess risk-taking motivated by poor performance
(Brown et al. (1996), Khorana (2001)). Moreover, it could be higher rent transfer that gives
incentive to the fund management to increase the amount of transactions. Therefore, the relation
between turnover and the advisory fee is an empirical question.
Tufano and Sevick (1997) point out that a higher minimum investment will reduce the
number of shareholder accounts, and have a negative effect on the total fee, increasing the

2 McLeod and Malhotra (1994); Malhotra and McLeod (1997); Latzko (1999); Rea et al. (1999); Securities and
Exchange Commission (2000); LaPlante (2001); Latzko (2004).
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monitoring power of shareholders. On the other hand, distribution of the fixed part of the
management cost over a larger number of accounts decreases the cost per account. Freeman and
Brown (2000) challenge the latter argument suggesting that additional shareholder accounts
resembles “the effect of adding viewers on the creative cost of devising a TV show.” and should
not affect the management cost. Thus, the relation between the advisory fee and the number of
shareholder accounts is not clear a priori.

1.2.1.2 Market factors
Due to its largely unconstrained nature, the advisory fee will depend on the contract
environment (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Deli (2002)). Moreover, if the mutual fund market is
self disciplinary and competitive, advisers that fail to be competitive on the advisory fee should
be driven out of the market. Luo (2002) reports that competition within the fund objective -measured by a Herfindahl index-- has a decreasing effect on the mark-up of management fees.
This proxy also suggests that competition will be stronger if there are more funds in an objective
or the assets are more equally distributed. Therefore, I expect the advisory fee to decrease as the
objective gets more competitive.
Besides the competition, the optimal advisory fee will be affected by the market norms if
the adviser actually attempts to meet these norms. In that case, the adviser would take the
competitors’ advisory fees into account while determining his or her own advisory fee. Thus, if
the common argument in the fund proxies stating that the advisory fee is set with respect to
similar funds’ is valid, then I should observe the adviser adjusting the advisory fee according to
the objective average. For example, if an adviser sets the advisory fee equal to the objective
average, a decrease in the objective average would require an advisory fee adjustment.
6

1.2.1.3 Fund performance
The literature suggests that bearing the cost of load fees or higher expense ratios does not
necessarily lead to better returns for investment.3 Furthermore, there is a tradeoff between higher
costs and excess return. Nevertheless, the adviser is likely to try to justify an increase in the
advisory fee by implying better performance is a signal of superior management skills. Similarly,
if performance is poor, the adviser is likely to be monitored more closely. Kuhnen (2005)
suggests that the advisory fee decreases when the fund is within the group of the lowest two
deciles of unadjusted performers.
If the investor reacts to simple performance measures as Sirri and Tufano (1998) suggest
then beating the market benchmark or objective average could be used to justify an increase in
advisory fee. Thus, a fund that beats its benchmark may be able to successfully signal superior
management skills.

1.2.1.4 Adviser’s decisions
As mentioned above, the literature argues that the advisory contracts are largely the
products of advisory firms themselves. Thus, the contractual advisory fee should not be
independent from the adviser’s decisions. The first group of these decisions is directly related to
portfolio management such as outsourcing the research service or the use of derivatives. These
decisions would be mainly cost reduction motivated and would be indirectly enforced by the
market factors that limit the degree of possible mark-up for excess premium. The second group is

3, Ippolitto (1989), Elton, Gruber, Das, Hlavka (1993), Grinblatt and Titman (1994), Droms and Walker (1994),
Gruber (1996), and Fortin and Michelson (1996)
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management decisions that are not directly linked to the portfolio management such as voluntary
fee reimbursement. The adviser is likely to consider the outcome of these decisions while
reviewing the advisory fee.

1.2.1.4.1 Research agreements and use of derivatives
The adviser takes market dynamics as given and these factors play mostly a constraining
role on the mark-up. However, there is a limit that the adviser can decrease the mark-up in order
to remain competitive without decreasing the cost of portfolio management. In an attempt to
reduce the cost or manipulate the advisory fee, the adviser may choose to alter portfolio
management techniques or adopt additional procedures. In the case of successful reduction of the
cost, the adviser chooses between passing on the reduction to shareholders as a lower advisory
fee and keeping the excess rent as an indirect mark-up.
One procedure would be outsourcing the research activity under agreements commonly
known as “soft dollar agreements” or “soft dollar arrangements.” When the research activity is
carried out by a separate entity, the adviser does not necessarily change the cost structure of
portfolio management but rather manipulates it. The cost of research which would otherwise be
paid out of the advisory fee is transferred from shareholders in the form of brokerage fees. In this
case, less rent transfer from shareholders under the advisory fee should be enough to accomplish
the remaining portfolio management functions. Thus, advisers that enter research agreements
should have lower advisory fees if they pass the reduction on to the shareholders.
Another procedure would be the use of derivatives. Even if the use of derivatives as an
alternative portfolio management tool requires the mutual fund board’s approval, it is the fund
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management that decides to actually use them. Deli and Varma (2002) suggest that approval of
derivatives varies between different types of funds based on the risk involved. Thus, the use of
the derivatives is not independent from the adviser’s marginal product. Although Koski and
Pontiff (1999) find that funds use derivatives as a means of reducing the transaction costs that are
necessary to keep a given portfolio exposure, Deli (2002) argues that there is no significant
relation between the use of derivatives and the advisory fee. On the other hand, it is possible that
the adviser proposes the successful use of derivatives as a signal of superior management skill.

1.2.1.4.2 Adviser’s management decisions
Deli (2002) suggests that equity and domestic funds with higher numbers of services
have higher advisory fees. However, services that are reported in fund’s NSAR filings4 under
item 54 are the services that the adviser provides, but is not fully reimbursed by the fund.5 In
case of non-reimbursement, the adviser has the option to adjust the advisory fee or forgo nonreimbursement probably because the current advisory contract already includes the necessary
mark-up. Furthermore, the adviser’s response to non-reimbursement may differ between the
services based on the structure of the service. If the cost of the service is mostly fixed and the
adviser could predetermine the approximate cost allocated to a specific fund (i.e. occupancy of

4

(1) Occupancy and office rental (2) Clerical and bookkeeping services (3) Accounting services (4) Services of
independent auditors (5) Services of outside counsel (6) Registration and filing fees (7)Stationery, supplies and
printing (8) Salaries & compensation of Registrant’s interested directors (9)Salaries & compensation of Registrant’s
disinterested directors (10) Salaries & compensation of Registrant’s officers who are not directors (11) Reports to
current shareholders (12) Determination of offering and redemption prices (13) Trading department (14) Prospectus
preparation and printing for current shareholders (15) Other
5

NSAR asks the fund (the registrant) to provide the following information under item 54 “Indicate below whether
services were supplied or paid for wholly or in substantial part by investment adviser(s) or administrator(s) in
connection with the advisory or administrative contract(s) but for which the adviser(s) or administrator(s) are not
reimbursed by the Registrant:”
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office rental), he or she can make necessary adjustments to advisory fee in advance. On the other
hand, if the cost of the service varies based on changing fund characteristics, or if the service is
solely used by the fund, the adviser could choose to adjust the advisory fee following the nonreimbursement of the service. Salaries and compensation of independent directors is a good
example for this type of service. Compensation of directors not only depends on the changing
workload of the fund but also on the fact that each fund compensates its board members
separately. Thus, the non-reimbursement of these types of services may increase the advisory fee
ex post.
Another management decision of the adviser is how the payment of gross administrative
fee would be. Funds pay the gross administrative fee separately or bundled with the gross
advisory fee. In the bundled case, the fund reports in the NSAR a gross administrative fee of
zero. Therefore, a fund that reports a positive administrative fee in the NSAR is expected to
report a lower advisory fee compared to a similar fund that reports the two costs combined.
Latzko (1999) finds larger economies of scale in administrative services cost. Therefore, any
existing economies of scale should not be affected even if the administrative fee and the advisory
fee are bundled.
Christoffersen (2001) suggests that ex ante contracting is affected by the possibility of ex
post voluntary reimbursement by the advisory firm. The best signal for the possibility of ex post
voluntary reimbursement is likely to be the ex ante reimbursement. Thus, I control for the
amount of ex ante voluntary reimbursement.
Overall, in a competitive market where the advisory fee contracts are dynamically
managed, the advisory fee contract is based on but not limited to the fund characteristics. The

10

advisory fee management would be affected by a set of factors. Successfully signaling superior
management skills (i.e. higher quality marginal product) may give the adviser the opportunity for
additional mark-up. However, in a dynamic market the adviser is expected to respond to the
competitors’ price and market structure as well. The reduction of mark-up solely based on
market factors is limited and enforces cost reduction as an alternative in order to remain
competitive. The adviser could reduce the portfolio management cost either by using more
sophisticated techniques such as derivatives or simply manipulate the advisory fee by adopting
procedures such as the “soft dollar agreement”. Besides these cost reduction techniques,
outcomes of the adviser’s management decisions would also have a significant effect on the
advisory fee.

1.2.2. Structure of advisory fee contracts
I further investigate whether the adviser dynamically manages the structure of advisory
fee contract based on the factors discussed above. Deli (2002) shows that the structures of the
advisory fee contracts differ between funds. He also provides evidence that the linear fixed fee
structure motivates the manager for taking on risk. Following Coles et al. (1999) and Deli
(2002), concavity is used in this study as the proxy of advisory fee contract’s structure.

11

1.3 Data and Methodology

The data covers a 9-year period from 1996 to 2004. 1996 was picked as the beginning
year since SEC started to make the filing of NSAR a requirement for a subsample of funds in
1994 and for the whole industry beginning in 1996. The information was collected from the fund
proxy reports, the NSAR-B, the SAI (Statement of Additional Information) and the CRSP
Survivorship Free Mutual Fund Database. Table 1 provides a list of variables with their sources
and definitions.
To construct the sample, I select randomly among the actively managed equity funds on
the CRSP Survivorship Free Mutual Fund Database after excluding index funds. Data are limited
to equity funds in order to make the collection process manageable, and most prior literature
focuses on equity funds. Index funds were eliminated because these funds are not actively
managed. Multiple classes of the same fund were also eliminated, thus the final list included
each fund only once. One possible concern may be that large fund families such as Fidelidity are
likely to appear more frequently, leading to a selection bias. However, considering the ongoing
fee competition between major fund families, it cannot be ruled out that an advisory firm which
has more weight in the industry might also have more influence on the industry norms.
Moreover, as mentioned above it is widely stated in fund proxies that comparing the fee rate of
the fund with the fee rate of similar funds is a common method. Thus, any bias in the sample set
due to this reason will also be valid for the population itself.
Funds are grouped according to their objective as defined in the CRSP Database. The
weight of each objective in the initial sample set was determined based on the weight of the
objective in the whole set of funds. For example, if there are 100 funds that were active in the
12

industry sometime between 1996 and 2004, and 20 of these funds are aggressive growth funds;
then my sample set was constructed such that 20% of it consists of aggressive growth funds. The
final data set consist of 176 funds, 109 of which are still active and 67 are dead. These 176 funds
are managed by 125 different advisers.
I collect the information about the funds and the advisers from the funds’ NSAR-B and
SAI. The advisory fee reported in fund NSAR-B at the end of a fiscal year is taken as the applied
advisory fee during that past fiscal year. The adviser is assumed to determine the applied
advisory fee after observing the information at the beginning of the fiscal year. For example, the
advisory fee reported in January 2000 NSAR-B is taken as the applied advisory fee for the year
1999 based on the information available to the adviser at the beginning of 1999, reported in
January 1999 NSAR-B.
For the models in Table 4 and Table 6, the dependent variable is the weighted advisory
fee measured in basis points. The study is limited to funds that have contracts defining advisory
fee as a percentage of total assets. Deli (2002) shows that the majority of the advisory fee
contracts have asset based fixed or scaled fee structures. Under a scaled fee contract, different
fee rates are applied to different ranges of assets. In the case of scaled fee contract, asset
weighted advisory fee is calculated by multiplying each fee level with the amount of asset the fee
is applied to using the total weighted average asset of the fund reported in NSAR-B. Thus, the
first fixed effects model for fund “i” where the advisory fee is regressed on lagged variables
(except research agreement dummy) is as follows;
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advfeei ,t =
ln fsizei ,t −1 + ln advsizei ,t −1 + turnoveri ,t −1 + ln numaccount i ,t −1 + herfindahl i ,t −1
+ feeratioi ,t −1 + ffari ,t −1 + derivused i ,t −1 + researchi ,t + nonreimbserv i ,t −1

(1)

+ feereimburs i ,t −1 + peradmfeei ,t −1 + ei ,t

Where the independent variables are fund size, adviser size, number of shareholder
accounts, objective Herfindahl index, objective management fee average, Fama French four
factor adjusted return, “use of derivatives” dummy, research dummy, percent nonreimbursement, percent fee reimbursement and percent administrative fee respectively. Detailed
definitions and the calculations of the variables are given in Table 1.
Fama French 4 factor adjusted return 6 is replaced with a “beat fund objective average
return” dummy in model 2 and is replaced with the spread between the fund return and the
objective average in model 3. Services are entered separately in model 4. Hausmann tests
favored fixed effects model. However, recent literature raises concern about the use of a more
restricted fixed effects model arguing that governance structures of corporations are too dynamic
to assume that uncontrolled variables are constant throughout the sample period. Therefore, such
assumption could lead to spurious results (Zhou 2001). Furthermore, the random effect models
allow for the inclusion of non-variant variables. Model 5 is the random effects model with the
additional non-variant variables of dead fund dummy and fund objective. Results of both
methods are reported for robustness check.
The dependent variable for the models in Table 5 is the concavity and the model is as
follows;

6 Intercept of the regression analysis where excess fund return is regressed on Fama and French four factors: small
to big (SMB), high minus low (HML), excess return on market (MKTRF) and momentum. Values for factors are
obtained from CRSP Survivorship Free Mutual Fund Database.
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concavity i ,t =
ln fsize i ,t −1 + ln advsizei ,t −1 + turnoveri ,t −1 + ln numaccount i ,t −1 + herfindahl i ,t −1

(2)

+ feeratioi ,t −1 + ffari ,t −1 + derivused i ,t −1 + researchi ,t + nonreimbserv i ,t −1
+ feereimburs i ,t −1 + peradmfeei ,t −1 + ei ,t

Concavity of fund “i” is calculated following Coles et al. (2000) and Deli (2002) as the
difference between the highest and the lowest advisory rate in funds fee scale, divided by the
applied advisory fee rate. It takes the value of zero for funds with a fixed fee structure.
concavityi ,t =

highestfee − lowestfee
appliedfee

(3)

The Herfindahl index of each objective is calculated in order to control for the
competitiveness of the objective. Using the notation of Luo (2002), the calculation of the
objective’s Herfindahl index h( I , i ) is as follows:
⎛
⎜ A
h( I , i ) = ∑ ⎜ k
k∈I ⎜ ∑ A j
⎝ j∈I

Where

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠

2

(4)

Ak
is the share of net assets of fund k relative to the total net assets in the
∑ Aj
j∈I

category.
Luo (2002) argues that if the competition among the advisers in an objective is Bertrand
competition then all advisers’ services are assumed to be homogeneous and equal. Therefore, I
should observe the advisers pricing their services equal to the marginal cost of the product
regardless of the number of advisers in the market. This would be the same as saying one adviser
is not different than another, which is a strong assumption in the mutual fund industry.
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Furthermore, Sutton (1991) shows that, over a broad class of oligopoly models, there is not
necessarily a relation between the number of market participants and the variable part of the cost
of the product. Thus, normalized Herfindahl indices are calculated following Luo’s (2002)
technique.
Specifically, the normalized Herfindahl index for category I in which fund i belong,
denoted hiI , is defined as:

hiI =

h( I , i )
−1
h c ( I , i)

(5)

Where h c ( I , i ) = 1 / N I ; N I denotes the number of funds in mutual fund category.
The normalized Herfindahl index characterizes the relative competitiveness of the
objective to which the fund belongs compared to the case where net assets are equally distributed
among all funds within the objective. For example, it takes the value of one if there exists one
fund in an objective.7

7

I repeated tests without normalizing the Herfindahl index as suggested by Luo (2002). Results remained
qualitatively the same.
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1.4 Empirical Analysis

1.4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 specifies that the asset weighted advisory fee mean is 73.17, median is 73.29
basis points. Partitioning the sample set based on the contract type reveals that fixed fee funds’
average advisory fee is 7.25 basis points higher than funds with concave fee contracts. Results
also provide preliminary evidence suggesting that use of derivatives is negatively related with
the advisory fee. Although all have linear fee structures, fixed fee funds that use derivatives have
on average lower advisory fee (79.79 bp.) than the fixed fee funds that do not (72.47 bp).
Furthermore, the funds that fail to survive during the sample period have 0.119% higher advisory
fee suggesting that competitive fee pricing may be necessary for survival.
Table 3 shows that average fund size is $254.55 million and average advisory size is
$9506.09 million. Average fund turnover is 90.48%. Funds do not fully reimburse the
management company, on average, for 6 services. Although, average voluntary reimbursement
of fees is equal to 21 basis points of net assets, the median is 0 basis points, indicating that a
significant number of funds do not reimburse fees. The number of years that the funds
voluntarily reimburse fees accounts for 47% of all observations. Administrative fee has the same
skewed distribution. Although the average administrative fee is 0.11% of the total net assets, the
median is just 0.013% since some funds combine the administrative costs with the advisory fee,
and report administrative expenses in NSAR as $0. The number of years that the administrative
fee is equal to zero accounts for 47% of the observations. Funds receive research service from an
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outside source for 81% of the fund years8, and use derivatives as a management tool for 44% of
the fund years indicating that these practices are not rare among funds.
Preliminary tests not reported here reveal that correlations between the advisory fee and
other types of rent transfer (i.e. loads and 12b-1) are positive and below 0.58. Thus, one type of
rent transfer is not used systematically as substitute for another.9 Finally, all VIF (variance
inflation factor) values are below 3, suggesting that there is no serious multicollinearity between
independent variables.10

1.4.2 Advisory Fee
1.4.2.1 Fund specific factors and adviser size

Table 4 reports results from the model (1) which dependent variable is the basis point
advisory fee. Results indicate that larger funds have lower advisory fees, consistent with the
previous literature and supports the existence of economies of scale. It also implies that funds
that manage to survive and grow reduce the advisory fee. However, a positive relation between
the adviser size and the advisory fee indicates that as the adviser grows, he or she charges higher
advisory fees. I interpret this result as the adviser reflecting the increasing market power to
shareholders as assets under the management grow.

8

These are the funds that stated that the item 26B in fund NSAR-B “receipt of investment research and statistical
information” as one of the “considerations which affected the participation of brokers or dealers or other entities in
commissions or other compensation paid on portfolio transactions of Registrant”
9 Advisory fee is the only form of rent transfer to the adviser solely for the purpose of portfolio management service
and represents the largest component of total fee. Nevertheless, it is not the only form of rent transfer to adviser.
Thus, one may argue that an adviser who transfers enough rent through other sources (such as 12b-1 and loads) may
accept a lower advisory fee.
10 Although there is no certain threshold in statistics for determining multicollinearity based on VIF values, 10 is
considered as the conservative threshold (Neter, Wasserman and Kutner 1985).
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1.4.2.2 Market factors

The positive relation between the fee ratio and the advisory fee indicate that the objective
average management fee is benchmarked. However, this benefits the shareholder only when
there is a decrease in the objective advisory fee. For example, if the objective average advisory
fee and the fund advisory fee ratio is 1 and the objective average advisory fee increases and ratio
becomes 2, the adviser negotiates for higher advisory fee for the following fiscal year. Similarly,
if the ratio is 2 and decreases to 1 after the objective average advisory fee decreases, the adviser
approves lower advisory fee for the following fiscal year. However, the Herfindahl index and the
advisory fee are not significantly related indicating that the advisory fee is not managed based on
the objective asset concentration.11

1.4.2.3 Fund returns

Results indicate that performance improvement does not necessarily signal superior
management skill leading to additional mark-up. Thus, the advisers tend to prefer to benefit from
investor’s “return chasing” behavior, additional fund inflow following a performance
improvement (Sirri and Tufano 1998). Further the second model where the Fama-French 4 factor
adjusted return is replaced by the dummy variable equal to one if the fund beats the benchmark
implies similar results. However, in model 3 where the adjusted return is replaced by the spread
between the benchmark and the adjusted fund performance suggest that sufficient spread
between the benchmark and the fund return is followed by additional mark-up. Although an
adviser who beats the benchmark index does not necessarily signal superior management skills,

11

This result is consistent with Warner and Wu (2005) where in a different and limited model they study the role of
economies of scale, advisor ability and industry competition on advisory fee contracts.
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performance improvement seems to be sufficient if the fund return exceeds a certain threshold
for signaling superior management. Table 5 reports the robustness check where the market
benchmark is replaced by the objective average return. Results are qualitatively the same.

1.4.2.4 Adviser’s decisions

Further results indicate that the adviser’s decisions related to portfolio management that
will reduce the cost of management or just manipulate the advisory fee without a fundamental
change to the overall cost affect the advisory fee. Decisions such as the use of derivatives, the
research agreements, separating administrative fee and fee reimbursements are used in order to
remain competitive and for indirect mark-up.

1.4.2.4.1 Use of derivatives and research agreements

One optional technique is the use of derivatives (options or futures). The negative result
between the use of derivatives and the advisory fee supports Koski and Pointiff’s (1999)
argument that the use of derivatives reduces the cost of portfolio management. Certainly, the
result does not rule out the argument that ability to use derivatives being taken as a signal of
superior management skill which could lead to an advisory fee increase; yet, the benefit seems to
exceed the potential cost of it. Although the use of derivatives has to be approved by the fund
board before they are actually used by the adviser, the robustness check in Table 5 shows that the
approval does not lead to a decrease in the advisory fee. Thus, the approval of the use of
derivatives by the board does not automatically signal that the adviser has superior management
skills.
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Another optional procedure is outsourcing the research activity. In this case, the cost of
research which would otherwise be paid out of the advisory fee is transferred from the
shareholder in the form of a brokerage fee. Such an agreement gives the adviser the opportunity
to reduce the advisory fee without a fundamental reduction in the overall cost of portfolio
management. Positive result between the research dummy and advisory fee suggests that funds
with such agreements have significantly lower advisory fees.

1.4.2.4.2 Adviser’s management decisions

One of the adviser’s management decisions is whether to bundle the gross administrative
fee with the gross advisory fee. Results imply that the advisory fee is lower for the funds that pay
a separate gross administration fee. Another management decision of the adviser is voluntary fee
reimbursement. Christoffersen (2001) suggests that expense reimbursements negotiated at the
end of the year are direct mechanism of temporary increase in fund returns thus rebalancing rent
transfer to shareholders. The contract environment is affected by the possibility of this ex post
reimbursement by the adviser. A signal of the possible ex post reimbursement practice is
voluntary reimbursement during the previous fiscal year. I find that ex ante voluntary fee
reimbursement leads to a higher advisory fee. Thus, previous voluntary fee reimbursement is
likely to be taken as a signal for possible fee reimbursement in the future. In this case, the
contractual fee might include some amount of mark-up that is expected to be ex post reimbursed.
Such mark-up gives the adviser opportunity to manage the rent transfer after the contract is
created.
The fourth and fifth models in Table 4 provide further evidence on non-reimbursed
services. In these two models, the aggregate number of non-reimbursed services is replaced by
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the dummy variables for the services listed in the NSAR. VIF values of all services are below
4.03 indicating that there is no serious multicollinearity between services. Only statistically
significant results are reported in Table 4. Although the total number of non-reimbursed services
and the advisory fee do not reveal any significant relation in previous models, results in the last
two models in Table 4 indicate that advisers do not follow a uniform strategy for the nonreimbursement among services. Results indicate that the adviser adjusts the advisory fee if the
adviser is not fully reimbursed for the disinterested directors’ and officers’ compensation. The
result supports the positive relation between independent director compensation and advisory
fee.12 The negative result of office rental could be due to the predictability of the cost which
gives the adviser the opportunity to make necessary mark-up ex ante. Furthermore, funds might
benefit from economies of scale since cost of office rent is allocated between funds under the
management of the same adviser.

1.4.3 Structure of advisory fee contracts

Asset based advisory fee contracts have either a linear fixed fee rate or a scaled fee
structure where decreasing fee levels are applied to certain ranges of the fund assets. The funds
in my sample set have a fixed advisory fee rate in 53% of the fund years. The descriptive
statistics reported in Table 2 show that the mean fixed advisory fee rate is 76.48 basis points. The
mean scaled advisory fee is 69.23 basis points. The difference in means is significant at 1%. Deli
(2002) argues that a fixed fee structure motivates the adviser to take on more risk since the
marginal increase in the amount of total rent for each additional dollar will be constant. On the

12

Tufano and Sevick (1997), Del Guercio et al. (2003), Khorana et al. (2005)
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other hand, shareholders are more likely to benefit from economies of scale if the advisory fee
contract has a scaled fee structure since the marginal fee rate per dollar monotonically decreases
as fund assets increase.
The results in Table 6 indicate a significant positive relation between fund size and
concavity. Smaller funds tend to have less concave (more linear) fee structure. This result is
consistent with the literature (Deli 2002, Warner and Wu 2005), confirming that smaller fund
managements are motivated to take on risk in order to grow and survive. This makes the risk
motivating fixed fee structure a more desirable choice for smaller funds. Furthermore, the second
model indicates that funds that fail to survive have less concave fee structures. Thus, the pressure
of survival leads the advisers to favor risk-motivating linear fee structures.
The research agreement dummy and convexity are positively related suggesting that the
advisers that reduce the advisory fee by outsourcing the research as the results above suggests
also adopt more convex fee structure which would pass on the benefit of the economies of scale
to shareholders. The funds that use derivatives have more linear contracts. If a more linear
contract signals motivation for taking on risk then the result implies that the advisers that
actively use derivatives possibly in order to manage portfolio risk, tend to be more motivated to
take on risk.

1.4.4 Limitations

Results suggest neither a form of causality nor an order of the factors. While determining
the optimal advisory fee, each adviser is likely to give different weights to each factor but the
results do not imply that the advisers favor one type of factors over another. Moreover, results
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should be interpreted carefully and not be taken as rejection of any alternative theory.
Performance is a good example for this phenomenon. Results suggest that superior performance
is rewarded by a higher advisory fee but they do not refute the alternative theory of performance
improvement as a result of excess resource allocation.
Furthermore, the advisory fee could be driven by some unaccounted factors. For
example, the study does not fully capture the possible effect of the adviser marginal product.
Any uncaptured difference between marginal products of the advisers could be partially
responsible for the variation of advisory fee. However, this is minimized through the use of a
panel model.
The data set is limited to actively managed equity funds. The literature documents
qualitatively similar results between the fund characteristics and the advisory fee of different
types of funds. Nevertheless, the relations between the advisory fee and other factors
investigated in this study like market norms, superior performance and use of alternative
portfolio techniques could be qualitatively and quantitatively different for other types of funds.
Finally, as Deli (2002) notes, there may be factors which have the potential to be
substitutes for the advisory fee that are not observed such as the adviser’s ownership of the fund.
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1.5 Conclusion

The determination of the advisory fee is based on, but not limited to, fund specific
characteristics. Market norms as well as the choice of portfolio techniques and management
decisions; affect the adviser’s decision about the price of the professional portfolio management.
Although the evidence suggests that the effect of market factors on the advisory fee is moderate,
the adviser’s decisions that would reduce the cost of management or just manipulate the advisory
fee without a fundamental change to the overall cost have relatively stronger impact on the
advisory fee.
The advisers systematically adjust the advisory fee based on the objective average as it is
commonly stated in fund proxies. However, this benefits the shareholders only when the
objective average declines. I find that the improvement of adjusted performance or beating the
benchmark index is not sufficient for the adviser to negotiate for an increase of the advisory fee.
Advisers successfully signal superior managerial skills for additional mark-up if the fund beats
the benchmark index or objective average by a significant spread. In a competitive market, the
limited nature of the reduction of mark-up without altering the cost structure would enforce cost
reduction in order to remain competitive. I show that advisers successfully use derivatives to
reduce the cost of portfolio management or engage in research agreements partially to
manipulate the advisory fee without necessarily changing the total cost.
I also show that besides the adviser’s decisions that are directly related to portfolio,
advisers actively manage the advisory fee based on the outcomes of their management decisions.
The funds that report the gross administrative fee and gross advisory fee separate have lower
advisory fees. Ex ante voluntary fee reimbursement affects the ex post contracting leading to
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higher advisory fee and the adviser increases the advisory fee if there is non-reimbursement for
the compensation of independent directors and officers.
Results on the structure of advisory fee contracts measured by the concavity indicate that
the motivation for risk taking is a strong factor in determining the advisory fee schedules.
Advisers of smaller funds or funds that have more incentive to take on risk in order to survive,
favor more linear advisory fee contracts. Finally, advisers actively use derivatives tend to be
more motivated to take on risk.
There are several issues that require further research. While my results suggest that
advisers reduce the advisory fee if they have research agreements, they do not provide insight on
whether the shareholders benefit overall from the transfer of the cost of research from the
advisory fee to the brokerage fee. The results do not address to what degree the persistence of
superior performance requires allocation of additional resource and if superior performance
covers the cost of this additional resource. Finally, the role of mutual fund boards in negotiating
the advisory fee requires further attention.
.
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TABLES
Table 1 List of variables names, sources and definitions

Name
Fund specific factors
and Adviser size

Source

Fund size

NSAR-B

Adviser Size

CRSP

Definition

Natural log of fund size reported under 74T measured in
millions of dollar
Total Net Asset of all funds managed by the same adviser
listed in a year in millions of dollar

Number of shareholder
account

NSAR-B

As reported under 74X in thousands of account

Turnover

NSAR-B

Lowest of the purchase or sales divided by the weighted
average assets

Fund Objective

CRSP

Fund objective in CRSP

Market factors
Herfindahl Index
Fee ratio

CRSP-Calculated
SAI

Herfindahl Index of fund objective
Proportion of fund management fee to fund objective
average

Fund performance
FFAR

CRSP-Calculated

Fama French four factor adjusted returns

Beat benchmark

CRSP-Calculated

D=1 if fund total net return is higher than fund benchmark

Spread b/w benchmark

CRSP-Calculated

Difference between fund return and fund benchmark

Beat objective average

CRSP-Calculated

D=1 if fund total return is higher than funds within the
same objective

Spread b/w objective
average

CRSP-Calculated

Difference between fund return and fund objective average

Adviser’s decisions
Research agreement

NSAR-B

D=1 if fund purchase research service

Derivatives used

NSAR-B

D=1 if fund management actually use derivates

Derivatives allowed

NSAR-B

D=1 if fund management is contractually allowed to use
derivates

Number of services nonreimbursed
Types of services nonreimbursed

NSAR-B

Number of services reported under item 54

NSAR-B

Dummy=1 if certain service is reported as non-reimbursed

Fee reimbursement
Percent administrative fee

NSAR-B
NSAR-B

Dollar amount reimbursed divided by total fund assets
Administrative fee under 72G divided by total net assets

Table 2 Advisory Fee Descriptive Statistics

Panel A

1st
3rd
Quartile Quartile
45.00
115.00

Advisory Fee (basis points)
All observations

N
1334

Mean
73.17

Median
73.29

Std.
dev.
21.21

Fixed fee

736

76.48

75.00

20.84

45.00

115.00

Scaled fee

598

69.23

66.57

21.01

45.75

115.25

Panel B
Fixed fee use derivatives

251

72.47

74.00

19.13

56.25

118.75

Fixed fee no use of derivatives

338

79.79

75.00

20.86

56.25

118.75

Dead funds

372

80.52

75.00

24.17

56.25

118.75

Live funds

962

70.33

70.00

19.21

45.00

115.00
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables

Panel A

Variables
Fund size ($ million)

Mean
254.55

Median
275.63

Adviser size ($ million)

9506.09

14445.80

Turnover

90.48

68.00

Services

5.80

6.00

% reimbursement

0.21%

0.00%

Num of account (thousand)

7374.75

10721.0

Percent Administrative cost

0.11%

0.013%

Variables
Research Agreement

1
81%

0
19%

Use of derivatives

44%

56%

Panel B
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Table 4 Panel Model Regressions of Advisory Fee

Variable definitions are in Table 1. Dependent variable is advisory fee in basis points in all models. First
three models are the results with different measurements for fund performance. Fourth model summarizes
the results where the non-reimbursed services are entered separately. Fifth model is the Random Effect
model where dead fund dummy and fund objectives are entered the model.
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5
75.820***
(4.310)

Fund size

-1.061***
(0.416)

-1.076***
(0.414)

-1.296***
(0.422)

-1.179***
(0.420)

-0.812**
(0.406)

Adviser size

0.846***
(0.327)

0.837***
(0.325)

0.840***
(0.324)

0.961***
(0.321)

-0.070
(0.286)

Turnover

-1.8E-04
(0.001)

-2.2E-04
(0.001)

-6.0E-04
(0.001)

3.0E-04
(0.001)

1.0E-04
(0.001)

-0.245
(0.329)

-0.245
(0.325)

-0.101
(0.329)

-0.145
(0.327)

-0.456
(0.296)

Constant

Fund specific factors and
Adviser size

Number of accounts
Dead fund dummy

2.670
(2.507)

Objective Dummy

included

Market factors
Herfindahl

-0.039
(0.040)

-0.043
(0.040)

-0.050
(0.040)

-0.052
(0.040)

-0.022
(0.041)

Fee Ratio

4.89***
(1.46)

4.76***
(1.47)

4.36***
(1.47)

4.46***
(1.47)

8.050***
(1.45)

2.227***
(0.831)

1.851**
(0.826)

1.579*
(0.824)

Fund performance
FFAR

1.044
(1.35)
0.377
(0.343)

Beat Benchmark
Spread b/w benchmark

Adviser’s decisions
Research Agreement

-2.596***
(0.734)

-2.562***
(0.725)

-2.548***
(0.722)

-2.231***
(0.723)

-2.257***
(0.715)

Derivatives used

-1.634**
(0.778)

-1.616**
(0.776)

-1.619**
(0.773)

-1.564**
(0.764)

-1.650**
(0.748)

-0.010
(0.129)

-0.009
(0.129)

-6.5E-04
(0.128)

0.013***
(0.005)

0.013***
(0.004)

0.011**
(0.005)

0.011**
(0.005)

0.014***
(0.004)

Number of service not
reimbursed
Basis points reimbursement
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Continued
-0.055***
(0.014)

-0.054***
(0.013)

Occupancy of office rental

-5.175***
(1.217)

-4.745***
(1.194)

Salary & Compensation of
disinterested directors
Salary & Compensation of
officers

6.235***
(2.000)

6.349**
(1.990)

2.103**
(0.930)

1.994**
(0.9810)

Fixed
173
0.06

Random
173
0.26

Percent administrative cost

-0.058***
(0.014)

-0.057***
(0.014)

-0.056***
(0.014)

Services

Models
Number of Funds
R2

Fixed
174
0.07

Fixed
173
0.08

Fixed
173
0.07

***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis.
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Table 5 Robustness Tests for Advisory Fee

Variable definitions are in Table 1. Dependent variable is advisory fee in basis points in all models. First
two models are the results with different measurements for fund performance where benchmark is
replaced with objective. Use of derivatives is replaced by the contractual permission in the third model.
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Fund size

-0.934**
(0.412)

-1.214***
(0.422)

-1.207***
(0.422)

Adviser size

0.809**
(0.325)

0.857***
(0.325)

0.882***
(0.326)

-1.04E-04
(0.001)

-4.2E-04
(0.001)

-4.4E-04
(0.001)

-0.336
(0.326)

-0.136
(0.332)

-0.155
(0.332)

Herfindahl

-0.039
(0.039)

-0.037
(0.039)

-0.037
(0.040)

Fee Ratio

5.09***
(1.465)

4.61***
(1.467)

4.81***
(1.472)

1.817*
(0.940)

1.867**
(0.941)
-2.475***
(0.725)

Variable

Fund specific factors and Adviser size

Turnover
Number of accounts

Market factors

Fund performance
-0.525
(0.386)

Beat objective average
Spread b/w average

Adviser’s decisions
Research Agreement

-2.602***
(0.726)

-2.431***
(0.725)

Derivatives used

-1.612**
(0.776)

-1.560**
(0.775)
-1.123
(0.919)

Derivatives contractually allowed
0.021
(0.129)

-8.9E-04
(0.129)

-0.010
(0.130)

Basis points reimbursement

0.014***
(0.005)

0.012**
(0.005)

0.012**
(0.005)

Percent administrative cost

-0.058***
(0.014)

-0.056***
(0.014)

-0.056***
(0.014)

174
0.09

173
0.07

174
0.07

Number of service not reimbursed

Number of Funds
R2

***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis.
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Table 6 Panel Model Regressions of Concavity

Variable definitions are in Table 1. Dependent variable is concavity of advisory fee.
Model 1

Variables

Model 2
0.134***
(0.046)

Constant

Fund specific factors and Adviser size
Fund size

0.009**
(0.004)

0.007*
(0.004)

Adviser size

3.9E-04
(0.003)

-7.9E-04
(0.003)

-7.5E-06
(1.15E-05)

-5.9E-06
(1.1E-5)

-0.006*
(0.003)

-0.001
(0.003)

Turnover
Number of accounts
Dead fund dummy

-0.089***
(0.028)

Objective Dummy
Market factors

included

Herfindahl

-5.5E-04
(4.3E-4)

-6.5E-04
(4.5E-4)

Fee Ratio

-0.017
(0.015)

-0.018
(0.015)

0.010
(0.015)

0.011
(0.015)

0.014**
(0.007)

0.014**
(0.007)

-0.032***
(0.008)

-0.028***
(0.008)

Number of service not reimbursed

0.003**
(0.001)

0.004***
(0.001)

Basis points reimbursement

2.0E-5
(4.9E-5)

-7.9E-6
(4.9E-5)

Percent administrative cost

1.2E-4
(1.8E-4)

1.0E-5
(1.7E-4)

164

164

0.01

0.13

Fund performance
FFAR

Adviser’s decisions
Research Agreement
Derivatives used

Number of Funds
2

R

***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis.
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PART 2. DIRECTOR CHARACTERISTICS AND THE ADVISORY FEE;
IMPACT OF REGULATION CHANGES
2.1 Introduction

The mutual fund industry grew dramatically over the last decade. This growth put several
aspects of the industry under scrutiny, including the role of mutual fund boards as effective
watchdogs of shareholder rights. Eventually, in 2000 the SEC passed a set of regulation changes,
including an increase in the proportion of independent directors from 40% to 50% of the board
and a mandatory nominating committee clause. Not long after the first regulation change, the
SEC adopted another set of regulation changes in 2004, which increased the independent board
member proportion from 50% to 75% and mandated the board chairman to be an independent
director. However, the effectiveness of these regulation changes has been debated since. In
particular, practitioners have been arguing since the 2004 regulation change that there is not
enough empirical evidence to support the independent board chairman clause.
The existing empirical evidence suggests that compensation contracts are the products of
bargaining between the participants rather than a process of finding a mutually optimal contract.
Bebchuk et al. (2002) suggest that managerial power over the board of directors distorts optimal
compensation contracts. However, a more effective board would bargain the advisory contract
more effectively reducing such distortion. Thus, a fee determined by a contract solely based on
the bargain between the adviser and the board would provide a robust proxy to measure the
governance ability of the board. Tufano and Sevick (1997) argue that the total fee is the product
of the bargain between the adviser and the board thus could be taken as a proxy for the
governance ability of the board. However, not all components of the total fee are the products of
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solely the negotiations. On the other hand, the advisory fee which is the major component of the
total fee, provides a robust proxy to study the effectiveness of the board. First, the advisory fee is
determined by the advisory contract which is based solely on the negotiations between the board
and the adviser. Second, the advisory fee is neither bound by any regulation, such as 12b-1 fees,
nor determined largely by the market dynamics, such as the cost of administrative expenses.
Deli (2002) argues that management contracts that define the fund advisory fee vary
across funds based on fund characteristics. However, due to its largely unconstrained nature, the
advisory fee would also depend on the contract environment (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Deli
(2002)). Therefore, the outcome of the fee negotiations could depend on factors other than the
fund characteristics. As Tufano and Sevick (1997) suggest more independent boards are better
watchdogs. Thus, improving general board characteristics are likely to lead to better board
governance. However, on going scrutiny and the last wave of fund scandals suggest that such
improvements have limited impact on improving the effectiveness of board governance.13
Governance effectiveness of the boards could depend on factors beyond the general
characteristics of the board. Individual characteristics of the board members may also be
important.
Although, the literature provides evidence on the relation between general board
characteristics and mutual fund governance, the relation between individual member
characteristics and fund board governance effectiveness is limited. Using a survivorship bias free
sample of 176 equity funds managed by 125 different advisors, I investigate the relation between
the advisory fee and general board characteristics as well as individual member characteristics
13

Average board independence of the funds that are managed by the advisers subject to litigation is 82% including
some funds with fully independent boards.
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such as tenure, background, number of seats occupied, other directorships, retirement/pension
benefits and compensation. Furthermore, I test whether the 2000 regulation changes have been
effective at improving mutual fund governance.
I find that funds with larger boards and boards with higher percentages of independence
have lower advisory fee. However, as much as the general composition and characteristics of the
board, the independent characteristics of the members affect the governance ability of the board.
Boards with higher percentages of members with a finance background, members that have
longer tenures and receive less compensation, negotiate lower fees. The results on the relation
between the advisory fee and three factors that are subject to the regulation change imply that the
impact of regulation change on board governance is somewhat limited. Having an independent
chairman does not directly improve the board governance. I find modest evidence that the impact
of an independent chairman is likely to depend on the expertise of the member that occupies the
chairman seat. Shareholders benefited from the increase of board independence around the
regulation change. However, the effect of regulation change on the possible target group is
limited. Finally, boards that established separate nominating committees are likely to display
more effective governance.
Section 1 discusses the variables and hypotheses. Section 2 provides information on the
data and methodology. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
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2.2 Variables and Hypothesis

I examine the relation between the advisory fee and the member characteristics as well as
the impact of latest regulation changes. I group the variables into two sets, the control variables
that have been used previously in the literature and the variables that test general fund board
characteristics and individual member characteristics.

2.2.1 Fund and Market Specific Variables

Deli (2002) and Kuhnen (2005a) show that advisory contracts differ based on fund
characteristics. Deli documents that larger funds and funds that are managed by larger fund
families have lower advisory fees. He also documents a direct relation between the fund turnover
and the advisory fee and no significant relation between reimbursed expenses and advisory fee.
Deli interprets the number of services reported in fund’s NSAR as the number of services
provided by the adviser to the fund shareholders. However, in the NSAR, they are defined as the
services that the adviser provides but does not get adequate reimbursement.14 Since the rate of
reimbursement controls for the effect of that phenomenon, I exclude the number of services from
my model. Ex post expense reimbursement negotiated at the end of the year is a direct
mechanism of temporary increase in the fund returns by rebalancing rent transfer from
shareholders (Christoffersen (2001)). Since previous use of the reimbursement mechanism is
likely to be the signal of possible use at the following fiscal term, I control for ex ante

14

NSAR asks the fund (the registrant) to provide the following information under item 54 “Indicate below whether
services were supplied or paid for wholly or in substantial part by investment adviser(s) or administrator(s) in
connection with the advisory or administrative contract(s) but for which the adviser(s) or administrator(s) are not
reimbursed by the Registrant:”
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reimbursement to control for an additional mark-up in the advisory fee contract approved by the
board with an expectation of ex post reimbursement.
Funds that perform well are likely to negotiate for higher fees arguing that better
performance is a signal of better management abilities. However, the relation between
performance and the advisory fee is not obvious a priori. The advisers may prefer to benefit from
the increase in fund inflow following good performance rather than increasing the advisory fee.
Moreover, poorly performing funds may simply be lower quality, and lower quality funds are
characterized by higher fees (Kuhnen (2005b)).
Funds that have a higher number of shareholder accounts are likely to require more
resources for management. However, the relation between the number of accounts and the
advisory fee is not obvious. While a higher number of accounts increases the total cost of
management, the marginal cost of management would decrease with each additional account
since the fixed cost of account management would be allocated over a larger number of accounts.
Moreover, a smaller number of shareholder would lead to less dispersion of shareholder power
and increase the shareholders’ monitoring power.
Funds follow two different methods for reporting the gross administrative fee in the
NSAR. They either report the gross administrative cost separately under item 72G or they
include it into the gross advisory fee under item 72F. I expect the funds that combine gross
administrative cost with the gross advisory cost to have higher contractual advisory fees.
The mutual fund industry is argued to be competitive and self disciplinary. Thus, market
dynamics as well as fund characteristics are likely to be factors that would affect the outcome of
the fee negotiations. The board is expected to negotiate for an advisory fee that would keep the
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fund competitive and reflect industry norms. To capture the effect of the competition for the
inflow to the fund objective, a Herfindahl index of the fund objective is included as a measure of
the competitiveness and concentration within the fund objective. More important, it is a common
statement in the fund proxies that the board approves the advisory fee after careful consideration
and comparison with similar funds. The difference between the average management fee of the
fund objective and the fund management fee is included in the model in order to control for the
norms of the portfolio management cost within the fund objective.

2.2.2 General Board Characteristics

The SEC’s main regulation changes to improve the governance of the fund boards require
higher board independence, an independent chairman and a mandatory nominating committee.
Prior literature suggests that performance is positively related to board independence for
corporate boards.15 A similar relation between board independence and total fund fee is
documented by Tufano and Sevick (1997) for open end funds and by Del Guercio et al. (2003)
for closed end funds. Almazan et al. (2004) show that funds with higher proportion of
independent directors impose fewer investment constraints on the fund management. Thus, board
independence is expected to have a negative effect on rent transfer from shareholders to the
adviser. Besides the board composition, the 2004 regulatory change requires the chairman to be
an independent director. However, the evidence on independent chairman is inconclusive.
Brickley et al. (1997) do not find a statistical relation between the firm’s leadership structure and
its performance for corporate boards. Varma (2003) suggests that an independent board leader

15

Weisbach (1988); Byrd and Hickman (1992); Brickley et al. (1994); Klein (1998)
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may empower the board and influence the board agenda. On the other hand, Vafeas (1999)
argues that an outside board chairman needs to be informed more frequently, which may
decrease the effectiveness of the board. Given, these conflicting results, I offer no directional
expectations between independent chairman and board governance.
The literature on board size suggests mixed evidence.16 Large boards are less likely to
engage in open dialogue about management performance (Jensen (1993)). The lack of open
dialogue is likely to affect the fee negotiations as well. Tufano and Sevick (1997) suggest that
funds with larger boards have higher total fees. Del Guercio et al (2003) present similar results
for closed end funds. However, the trend of delegating the responsibilities of the board to
committees is gaining popularity among funds. Such practices that would improve the
effectiveness of the board are likely to require larger boards.
Finally, an independent nominating committee is mandated by the regulation change of
2000. By introducing this clause, the SEC attempted to improve the selection process of new
board members. Vance (1983) argues that nominating committee is one of the four committees
that greatly influence corporate activities. Funds established either a completely separate
nominating committee or stated in their proxies how the nomination of new members would be
handled solely by independent directors. Kesner (1998) argues that most important board
decisions originate at the committee level. A separate nominating committee rather than a sub
committee that handles multiple tasks does not only allow the board to focus on the selection of
new members but is also likely to signal the quality of board governance. Thus, I expect the

16

Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998), Dalton et al. (1999), Xie et al. (2003)
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establishment of a separate nominating committee as a signal of better governance ability leading
to lower advisory fees.

2.2.3 Individual Director Characteristics

The recent fund scandals suggest that virtually similar boards, with the same
independence and size, display different governance effectiveness. Thus, factors that determine
the governance ability of a mutual fund board extend beyond the total number or fraction of
independence of board seats. The independent characteristics of members that occupy those seats
are likely to affect board’s governance ability. Most of the member characteristics are not
arbitrary but largely determined by the members themselves. They are either determined by the
existing members (e.g. background of the new member) since the new members are nominated
by the existing board members or by the members themselves (e.g. number of fund boards a
member accepts to sit and length of service (tenure)).
However, the relation between most of these variables and the advisory fee are not
obvious a priori. For example, funds benefit from the expertise of members who have been
sitting on the board for a long time. However, the selection process could be influenced by the
adviser. In practice initial boards are formed by the adviser and evolve throughout the life of the
fund. Therefore, these members could be chosen to the board by the adviser at the fund’s
inception and may be more likely to align their interests with the adviser’s. Similarly, the
literature suggests contradicting results between the number of fund boards a director sits and his
or her governance ability. The lack of time to carry out their duties is one of the common
problems among directors (Lipton and Lorsch (1992)). Sitting on multiple fund boards decreases
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the time a director devotes to each fund.17 Moreover, the courts have accepted the argument of
“occupying multiple board seats raises the compensation of the director which makes the
independence of the director questionable”.18 However, Tufano and Sevick (1997) find a
negative relation between the total fund fee and director concentration, suggesting that the
directors who oversee larger proportions of the adviser’s total assets are better monitors. The
time a member spends for a particular fund would also decrease if the individual has a
directorship outside the fund family (Morck et al. 1988; Beasley 1996). On the other hand,
having an outside directorship could be interpreted as a signal of the quality of the director
(Booth and Deli (1999), Shivdasani and Yermack (1999)). Moreover, it might reduce the
possibility of aligning the board member’s interest with the adviser’s by increasing the
compensation if he or she has alternative income sources. The problem of limited time could be
overcome to some extend by improving the efficiency of the use of it. Sarbanes and Oxley
requires at least one member with a background familiar with auditing procedures. Likewise,
directors who have a background in finance or a related field are likely to be more familiar with
the concepts of fund management, utilize limited time more efficiently and be more effective at
governing the fund. Xie et. al (2003) report that outside directors with finance background are
better monitors of earning management for corporate boards. Beasley (1996) finds that the
likelihood of financial reporting fraud is a decreasing function of the tenure of outside directors.
As mentioned above, higher compensation may make independent directors “not so
independent”. However, the literature provides mixed evidence about the effect of compensation

17

For the mutual fund governance index Morningstar introduced in December 2004, it was assumed that having a
director sitting on more than 12 fund boards would have negative impact on board oversight.
18

Olesh v. Dreyfus, Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens and Clark, the Brazil fund law suit.
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on the oversight of independent directors.19 A positive relation between compensation and
advisory fee could be signal of superior ability of members deserving higher compensation as
well as an attempt to create an incentive to align an independent director’s interest closer with
the adviser’s. Finally, rent transfer from shareholders as compensation is not limited to the
amount for independent directors. In some of cases boards approve compensation for dependent
directors who are affiliated with or employed by the adviser20. Approval of such rent transfer
would be a signal of poor governance.

2.2.4 SEC’s Regulation Change of Board Independence

The effectiveness of the regulation change of 2000 was criticized as being limited since
almost all of the funds were already well above the 50% minimum board independence by the
time the regulation change became effective. Nevertheless, it put board independence in the
spotlight of the debate on improving mutual fund governance. The SEC’s revisit to the
phenomenon concluded with the 2004 regulation change of increasing the minimum board
independence to 75%. Khorana et al. (2005) find that the impact of an independent board is felt
when the board is fully independent. However, without a mandatory fully independent board
clause, already high average board independence suggests that the regulation change would not
lead to an increase in board independence for the whole industry and would be limited to a
number of funds close to the new threshold. Thus, examining the whole industry could fail to
capture the true impact of the independence increase due to lower variance of board

19

Tufano and Sevick (1997), Vafeas (1999), Perry (2000), Ryan and Wiggins (2004)

20

For example Arthur Levitt, then Chairman of the SEC, raised the following question for the fund
industry:“[S]hould fund directors pay ‘interested directors’ when they already work for the fund management
company?” (Tam and Lucchetti, 1999, p. C25). (as cited by Varma 2003)
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independence in the whole industry. To explore the effectiveness of the regulation change, I
investigate if the relation between board independence and the advisory fee changed for the
subset of possible target funds and for the subset of funds that experience an increase around the
regulation change. In other words, I examine those funds that responded around the time of the
regulation change by altering their board.
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2.3 Data and Methodology

The data covers a 9-year period of boards from 1996 to 2004. 1996 was picked as the
beginning year since the SEC started to make the filing of an NSAR a requirement for a
subsample of funds in 1994 and for all funds in 1996. The funds’ SAI (Statement of Additional
Information) and NSAR filings are available on EDGAR after this year. The information was
collected from the fund proxy reports, NSAR-B, SAI and the CRSP Survivorship Free Mutual
Fund Database.
To construct the sample set, I select randomly among the actively managed equity funds
on the CRSP Survivorship Free Mutual Fund Database after excluding index funds. My data are
limited to equity funds in order to make the data collection process manageable, and most prior
literature focuses on equity funds. Index funds are eliminated because these funds are not
actively managed. Multiple classes of the same fund are also eliminated, thus the final list
includes each fund only once. One possible concern may be that large fund families such as
Fidelidity are likely to appear more frequently, leading to a selection bias. However, considering
the ongoing fee competition between major fund families, it cannot be ruled out that an advisory
firm which has more weight in the industry would also have more influence on the industry
norms. Moreover, as mentioned above it is widely stated by the boards in fund proxies that
comparing the fund fee with the fees of similar funds is a common method. Thus, such
characteristic of a randomly selected sample set would be reflective of the whole population of
equity funds.
Funds are grouped according to their objective as defined in the fund proxy. The weight
of each objective in the sample set was determined based on the weight of the objective in the
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whole population of equity funds. For example, if there are 100 funds that were active in the
industry between 1995 and 2004, and 20 of these funds are aggressive growth funds; then my
sample set was constructed such that 20% would be aggressive growth funds. The final data set
consist of 176 funds managed by 125 different advisers, 109 of which are active and 67 are dead
by the end of 2004.
The information about the fund boards and member characteristics are collected from the
funds’ SAI. Other information is collected from the funds’ NSAR-B. The advisory fee reported
in the NSAR-B at the end of a fiscal year is taken as the applied advisory fee during that last
fiscal year. The board is considered as determining this applied advisory fee after observing the
information at the beginning of the fiscal year. For example, the advisory fee reported in the
January 2000 NSAR-B is taken as the advisory fee applied over the year of 1999 approved by
the board at the beginning of 1999 based on the information available to the board at the
beginning of 1999, reported in January 1999 NSAR-B.21
Deli (2002) shows that the majority of the advisory fee contracts have asset based fixed
or scaled fee structures. Under a fixed fee structure, the advisory fee is a flat rate independent
from the asset size. Under a scaled fee contract, different fee rates are applied to different ranges
of assets. The asset weighted advisory fee of the funds with a scaled fee contract is calculated by
multiplying each fee level with the amount of assets the fee is applied, using the total weighted
average assets of the fund reported in the NSAR-B. Table 1 provides a complete list of variables
with their sources and definitions.

21

SAI or NSAR filings that end between January and May of a year are taken as reflecting the information on the
fund for the previous year.
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I use a general fixed effects model for fund “i” where the advisory fee is regressed
against the quantitative and dummy variables as follows;
advfeei ,t =
ln fsize i ,t −1 + ln advsizei ,t −1 + turn i ,t −1 + ln numaccoi ,t −1 + reimburs i ,t −1 + ln admfeei ,t −1
+ ffari ,t −1 + herf i ,t −1 + feesprd i ,t −1 + numseat i ,t + boardindep i ,t + chindep i ,t

(6)

+ medfsit i ,t + medteni ,t + othdirp i ,t + finp i ,t + lawp i ,t + edup i ,t + fcomp i ,t −1 + ei ,t

Where the first group of independent variables control for fund and market characteristics
(i.e. the natural log of fund size, the natural log of adviser size, fund turnover, the natural log of
number of shareholder accounts, the percentage of reimbursement, the natural log of
administrative cost, the Fama French four factor adjusted return, the objective Herfindahl index,
the difference between the average objective management fee and the fund management fee)
To capture general board characteristics, I include the board size, the percentage of
independent board members, and dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the board chairman
is independent.
To control for the individual member characteristics, I include the percentage of the
adviser’s fund boards an independent director sits, median of the tenure of the independent board
members, percentage of independent directors that have at least one position on a board other
than funds’ managed by the same adviser, percentage of members that have finance, law or
education (e.g. academician) background, and following Khorana et. al. (2005) the median dollar
amount of compensation paid to the members for their service during the past fiscal year. Since
some funds report the compensation paid to each director at the trust (group of funds) level rather
than individual fund level, fund level compensation is estimated by dividing the compensation
paid by the trust by the number of funds in the trust.
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The Herfindahl index of each objective is calculated in order to control for the
competitiveness. The calculation of the objective’s Herfindahl index h( I , i ) is as follows:
⎛
⎜ A
h( I , i ) = ∑ ⎜ k
k∈I ⎜ ∑ A j
⎝ j∈I

Where

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠

2

(7)

Ak
is the share of net assets of fund k relative to the total net assets in the
∑ Aj
j∈I

category.
Luo (2002) argues that if the competition among the advisers in an objective is Bertrand
competition then all advisers’ services are assumed to be homogeneous and equal. Then, I should
observe the advisers pricing their services equal to the marginal cost of product regardless of the
number of the advisers in the market. This would be the same as saying one adviser is no
different than any other, which is a strong assumption for the mutual fund industry. Sutton
(1991) shows that, over a broad class of oligopoly models, there is not necessarily a relation
between the number of market participants and the variable part of the cost of the product. Thus,
normalized Herfindahl indices are calculated following Luo’s (2002) technique.
Specifically, the normalized Herfindahl index for category I in which fund i belong,
denoted hiI , is defined as:

hiI =

h( I , i )
−1
h c ( I , i)

(8)

Where h c ( I , i ) = 1 / N I ; N I denotes the number of funds in mutual fund category.
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The normalized Herfindahl index characterizes the relative competitiveness of the
objective to which the fund belongs compared to the case where net assets are equally distributed
among all funds within the objective. For example, it takes the value of one if there is one fund
in an objective.22
Almost all of the funds already meet the 50% criteria by 2000 and roughly half have
more than 75% independence which is later required by the 2004 regulation change. This leaves
little room for a number of funds to increase the existing percentage of board independence to
higher levels. Thus, testing the impact of regulation change using the whole sample set reduces
the variability and is likely to fail to fully investigate the change in fund governance due to an
increase in board independence around regulation change.23 In order to examine the impact of
the regulation change of 2000, I construct two alternative subsets to investigate whether funds
that experience an increase in board independence around the regulation change have improved
their governance. The first subset consists of 85 funds that experience an increase in mean board
independence between the periods of 1996-2000 and 2001-2004. An alternative subset includes
61 funds that increase board independence between 1999, the last year before the regulation
change, and 2001, the deadline year for adoption of regulation change. 47 funds appear in both
sets. Both subsets are divided into two time periods of 1996 to 2000 and 2001 to 2004. Equation
(1) is estimated for each time period as well as the whole period of 1996 to 2004. Since the
motivation behind the increase in independence could be unrelated to the regulation change, I
repeat the same test with a subset of funds that have independence levels below 65% at the

22

I repeated tests without normalizing the Herfindahl index. Results remained qualitatively the same.
Although, there are attempts in the literature to test the effectiveness of the 2000 regulation change in a cross
sectional data setting, investigating the impact of a regulation change requires a panel data set that covers the periods
before and after the date of the regulation change.

23
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beginning of year 2000. Arguably, these are the possible funds at which the regulation change
was aimed.
Finally, the data on nominating committees are collected from fund SAI for the 3 year
period of 2002 to 2004. The deadline to adopt the mandatory nominating clause was 2001 and
disclosure of information on committees became largely available after 2002. Funds established
either a completely separate nominating committee or delegated the nominating task to more
general committees. A reduced form of Equation (1) is estimated separately for this time period
including the dummy variable for the existence of a completely separate nominating committee
and the number of meetings the completely separate nominating committee held.
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2.4 Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistics of control variables are summarized at Panel A of Table 2. The
data set consists of randomly selected 176 equity funds with an average advisory fee of 73.20
basis points and a median of 73.59 basis points.24 The average fund size is 243.72 million dollar
and the average adviser size is 9.319 billion dollar. The administrative fee in dollars has a higher
mean than median due to the funds that bundle administrative costs with the advisory fee and
report zero administrative costs. The average difference between the objective management fee
and the fund management fee is 3.09 basis points, indicating that on average funds in the sample
set have management fee almost equal to the objective average fee.25
The descriptive statistics on Panel B show that, average fund independence is 74.72%
indicating that during the period of 1995-2004 the majority of the funds are well above the 50%
board independence level that was required by the 2000 regulation change. Moreover, roughly
half of the funds meet the requirement of 75% board independence level which was introduced
later in 2004. This structure of the equity fund boards suggests that the industry as a whole has
not responded to the regulation change simultaneously to alter the board composition.
Average board size is 8. Independent directors on average sit on the 66% of the funds that
are managed by the same adviser and have a median tenure of 7 years on the fund board. 23.87%
of the independent members have a finance background, 10.97% have an education background
and 6.46% have a law background. The descriptive statistics on Panel C show that having a

24

Average advisory fee for equity funds documented in literature is around 76 basis points

25

As an alternative measure, “fee ratio” between objective and fund management fee is calculated. The mean is 1.02
confirming that the funds in the sample set are close to the objective norms.

51

member with one of these backgrounds is fairly common among the fund boards. 78% of the
fund years, there is at least one independent member with a finance background; 46% of the fund
years, there is at least one independent member with an education background and 31% of the
fund years, fund boards have at least one member with a law background. 52.04% of the
independent members sit as a director on a board outside the funds’ managed by the adviser.
Besides increasing mandatory board independence from 50% to 75%, the regulation
change of 2004 also mandated the board chairman to be an independent director. Descriptive
statistics show that for the 9 years period prior to 2004, 20% of the funds have an independent
board chairman.
Average compensation paid to an independent member by the fund is 3,823 dollars.
Although, the dependent board members are employees of the adviser or affiliated with the
adviser, at 25.38% of the fund years, at least one dependent board member has received
compensation from the fund.
Panel D summarizes the descriptive statistics of the average board independence for the
whole sample set and the subsets, (i.e. subset that increase in mean between the periods of 19962000 and 2001-2004, subset that increase between 1999 and 2001 and the possible target set.)
The difference in average fund independence for the whole sample set between the periods of
1996-2000 and 2001-2004 is 3.38% significant at 1%. For the first subset of funds that have
increase in mean independence, the difference between the two periods is 8.23% and for the
remaining funds which experience “decrease or no change” in mean, the difference between the
two periods is -3.27%. For the second subset of funds that have increase in mean independence
between 1999 and 2001, the difference is 6.15% and for the funds which experience “decrease or
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no change” between 1999 and 2001 the difference between is -3.02%. The differences between
two periods for both subsets of funds that have an increase in board independence are significant
at 1% whereas for the “decrease or no change” group differences are not significant at 1%.
Average independence of the possible target funds that have independence below 65% is 58.90%
at 1996-2000 period and 66.01% at 2001-2004 period. Thus, funds that have independence close
to the minimum threshold also increased their board independence during the period following
regulation change.
Finally, I computed variance inflation factors (VIFs), yet never obtained VIFs in excess
4.3, below the conventional cutoff value of ten implying no severe multicollinearity exist
between variables. (Netter, Wasserman & Kutner 1985).
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2.5 Empirical Results

Results of the estimated models are summarized at Table 4. The dependent variable is the
weighted advisory fee in basis points. Independent variables are included in the models in groups
in order to show that the results are largely consistent and not based on certain model
specifications. Larger funds have lower advisory fees confirming Deli (2002). However, the
relation between adviser size and the advisory fee is positive which contradicts his findings. This
is likely to indicate that as the adviser’s market share grows, he or she tends to charge a higher
advisory fee for fund management. However, this result does not rule out the possibility that
although a successful adviser that attracts additional asset demands a higher price for his or her
marginal product, he or she simultaneously adjusts other channels of rent transfer (e.g. loads and
12b-1 fees) in order to remain competitive.
Adjusted performance is not significantly related to the advisory fee suggesting that
advisers prefer to benefit from additional fund inflow following good performance. However, the
positive relation between the advisory fee and the spread between fund return and objective
average return indicates that a higher spread leads to higher advisory fee.26 This implies that an
increase in performance alone does not lead to the additional mark-up. However, funds that beat
their peers significantly benefit not only from additional inflow but also from higher rent transfer
through the advisory fee which would be applied to not only besides the new shareholders but
also to the existing shareholders.

26

I repeated the test with the difference between the fund benchmark index and the adjusted fund return. Results are
qualitatively the same.

54

Descriptive statistics above indicate that the fund management fee and objective
management fee are close. However, the significant negative relation between the advisory fee
and the spread between the objective and the fund management fee suggests that the relation is
dynamic. Boards adjust the management fee strategically but not always for the benefit of
shareholders. For example, if there is a negative (-1%) difference (i.e. fund fee is above the
objective fee) and the objective fee decreases and the difference becomes -2%, the fund fee
decreases approaching the new level of the benchmark. In this case, the decline in the fund fee is
beneficial to the shareholders. However, if the difference is 1% (i.e. fund fee is below the
objective fee) and the objective fee increases and the difference becomes 2%, the fund increases
the management fee approaching the new objective average. In this case, the fund management
fee is still benchmarked to the objective average but adjustment is detrimental to the
shareholders’ wealth. Thus, results confirm the boards’ common argument in fund proxies which
states that the advisory fee is approved after consideration and comparison with similar funds.
Fund boards benchmark to the objective average, yet this benefits the shareholders if the fund fee
follows a decreasing benchmark and detriments if the pattern is upwards.
I do not find a significant relation between the Herfindahl index of objective (proxy for
competitiveness and concentration within the objective) and the advisory fee. This result
suggests that the boards do not adjust the advisory fee based on objective competitiveness and
contradicts the argument of a self disciplinary fund industry.

2.5.1 Board Characteristics and Fund Governance

The relation between the board size and the advisory fee is significant and negative
supporting the finding of Baker and Gompers (2003) and Kuhnen (2005b) suggesting that higher
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board size increase the monitoring potential of the board.27 Considering the necessary time to
govern each fund that a single board oversees and the increasing number of committees in the
fund industry, I interpret this result as larger boards have more aggregate time to allocate to the
governance of a particular fund and are able to delegate tasks to specific committees. Board
independence is negatively related to the advisory fee indicating that a board that has higher
percentage of independent members displays better governance ability. This result is consistent
with Tufano and Sevick (1997) and Del Guercio et al. (2003) and supports the SEC’s motivation
behind increasing the mandatory minimum level of board independence.
The results do not suggest a significant relation between the independent board chairman
dummy and the advisory fee. This supports the industry practitioners’ view of limited
effectiveness of the mandatory independent chairman clause introduced by the SEC’s 2004
regulation change. Although, the last two full models at Table 4 imply that an independent chair
alone does not necessarily lead to better governance, the positive relation between the tenure of
the independent chairman and the advisory fee indicates that the higher the tenure of the
chairman of the board, the better the board governance is.28 Thus, the expertise of the individual
that would occupy the seat has an impact on the fund governance.

27

In tests not reported here, I do not find evidence of non-linear relation.

28

Vafeas (1999) argues that an independent chairman would improve the fund governance by influencing the board
agenda. In the cases where the chairman is not independent such influence would likely to be determined by the
expertise of independent board members. Therefore, for observations where the board chairman is not independent I
set the value to median tenure of independent members reflecting the aggregate expertise of the independent portion
of the board.
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As a robustness check, I also repeated the tests including the mandatory retirement age
which is suggested by ICI in order to improve fund governance29 and the percentage of
independent members since the fund’s inception to investigate whether these members
deteriorate the governance by aligning their interests with the adviser’s. I find that the board
governance neither improves nor worsens from adopting a mandatory retirement age or
retirement plan and having members since the fund’s inception. Results remained qualitatively
the same.

2.5.2 Member Characteristics and Fund Governance

The results between individual member characteristics and the advisory fee suggest that
not only the general composition and characteristics of the board but also individual
characteristics of members that occupy the seats are effective on board governance. Table 4
shows that boards which have members with higher tenure display better governance ability. The
shareholders are likely to benefit from the expertise of members who have been sitting on the
fund board for a longer period and are familiar with the fund management.30 Members with a
finance related background are likely to be more familiar with the tasks of fund management.
The positive relation between the percent of members with a finance background and the
advisory fee indicates that members with a finance background govern shareholder rights better
than their peers. Interestingly, the fourth model suggests modest evidence that member with an
education background (employed in education sector) are likely to be less effective in

29

At 18% of fund years funds have a pension/retirement plan. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) report 13.16% of the
corporate boards in their sample set have a pension/retirement plan.

30

I also checked for a non-linear relation between the tenure and the advisory fee to control for whether the relation
reverse in the long run as members align their interest with the adviser’s and find no non-linear relation.
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governance. Fund compensation is included separately in the last two models. Results indicate
that funds that pay higher compensation to its independent members have higher advisory fees.
This could signal that better compensated directors are likely to align their interest with the
adviser.31 Results do not suggest a significant relation between the advisory fee and the fraction
of the adviser’s funds independent members sit. Finally, there is no significant relation between
the percentages of members that sit on a board other than the funds’ managed by the same
adviser and the overall governance effectiveness of the fund board. This result is consistent with
the finding of Brickley et al. (1997).

2.5.3 Separate Nominating Committee

The regulation change of 2000 also mandated an independent nominating committee.
Following the regulation change, funds either formed a separate nominating committee or
specified how the task would be handled solely by independent directors (e.g. including the
nominating task into the responsibilities of another committee). I estimated a separate restricted
model for the shorter period of 2002-2004 since the data on board committees and number of
committee meetings are widely available only after 2002. In Table 5, the negative relation
between the existence of a separate nominating committees and the advisory fee indicates that
funds that form separate independent nominating committee display better governance ability.
Since the impact of the nominating would actually be felt over the longer period, the result
mostly implies that establishing a separate nominating committee signals the quality of board
governance. The number of nominating committee meetings is not significantly related to
31

Further tests of total compensation and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if fund has paid compensation
to the dependent members during the past fiscal year reveal no significant relation. Results remain qualitatively the
same.
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advisory fee. This is probably due to the way the nominating committee functions. The
nominating committee meets whenever there is need for a new member.32

2.5.4 Regulation Change and Board Independence

Table 6 summarizes the results on whether the relation between board independence and
the advisory fee has changed for the funds that experience an increase in board independence
around the regulation change. Columns 2, 3 and 4 summarize the results for the subset of funds
that have an increase in mean board independence between the periods of 1996-2000 and 20012004. Results in column 2 indicate that this subset of funds has a negative relation similar to the
whole sample over the 10 years period. Higher independence leads to more effective governance.
Column 3 and 4 investigate whether the increase in board independence after the regulation
change improved board governance. Results indicate no significant relation between board
independence and the advisory fee for the 1996-2000 period (before the regulation change)
whereas a negative relation for the 2001-2004 period suggests that boards that increased their
independence after the regulation change improved in governance. Furthermore, the negative
relation between the independent chairman and the fund governance disappears after the
regulation change, suggesting that the positive relation in the whole sample is driven by the
observations before 2000.
The subset of funds that increased board independence between 1999 and 2001 indicates
similar and qualitatively stronger results. The relation between the independent chairman and
fund governance disappears after 2000 for the alternative subset as well. Thus, the results on the

32

Furthermore, tests that are not reported indicate that there is also no significant relation between the size of the
nominating committee and the advisory fee.
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first six columns overall indicate that shareholders of the funds that experienced an increase in
board independence around the regulation change benefited from the change in board
composition.
However, the boards of funds that experience increase in board independence around the
regulation change could be motivated by reasons other than regulation change. I repeat the tests
with the subset of target funds that have board independence less than 65% in 2000. Despite
board independence increases by 7.11% on average, funds that have 65% or less independence
prior to the regulation change do not display the same trend as the other two subsets.33 Although
they are possibly the primary target group of the regulation change, there is no significant
positive relation between governance quality and board independence of the funds with
independence below 65%. Results do not suggest that an increase in board independence leads to
significant improvement of governance for the target group of funds.
Overall, the results at Table 6 suggest that funds that have increased their independence
around the regulation change improved their governance ability. However, such a change in the
funds’ board composition is likely to have motivations other than the regulation change since
there is no evidence of similar improvement in the target group. The regulation changes of 2000
and 2004 are crucial steps in improving the fund governance. However, considering that 4 of the
34 funds in the sample set that are managed by the advisors subject to litigation during the last
wave of scandals had 100% independence34 and the limited effect of regulation change on the
possible target group, there is some truth to the idea that not only what the percentage of board

33

Tests are repeated with the subsets of funds with less than 70% independence and 75% independence. Results
remained qualitatively the same.

34

Average independence of 34 funds is 82% during the period of litigations.
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independence is but also by whom the independent seats are filled is critical for mutual fund
governance. Now that funds have an independent nominating committee and stricter disclosure
rules, existing board members have more ability to select the best individuals to serve for the
shareholders’ best interest.

2.5.4 Limitations

Results suggest neither a form of causality nor an order of the factors. Furthermore,
advisory fee could be driven by some unaccounted factors. For example, the study does not fully
capture the possible effect of the adviser marginal product. Any uncaptured difference between
the marginal products of the advisers could be partially responsible for the variation of advisory
fee. However, this is minimized through the use of a panel model. As Deli (2002) notes, there
may be factors that are not observed such as the adviser’s ownership of the fund which have the
potential to be substitutes for the advisory fee.
The data set is limited to actively managed equity funds. Nevertheless, the literature
documents qualitatively similar relations between the fund characteristics and the advisory fee of
different types of funds. Moreover, the results do not refute the alternative hypothesis.
Compensation is a good example for this. Although, the relation between the advisory fee and
compensation is positive, this could be partially due to the necessity of higher compensation to
include better individuals to the board.
Results suggest that although the increase in board independence around regulation
change improved the fund governance, the funds that are possible target group does not display
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the same pattern. These results are needed to be interpreted carefully since the actual reason of
increase in board independence could be other than regulation change or a related factor.
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2.6 Conclusion

The rapid growth of the mutual fund industry escalated the debate on many aspects of the
industry including the effectiveness of mutual fund boards as the watchdogs of the shareholder
rights. In 2000, the SEC passed regulation changes that increased the minimum required board
independence from 40% to 50% and mandated the nomination of the new members to be done
only by independent members. With another set of regulation changes in 2004, the SEC
increased the board independence further to 75% and mandated the board chairman to be
independent. Yet, the latest scandals suggest that the governance effectiveness of a board is
determined by factors beyond the general characteristics of the board that were subject to the
regulation changes. After controlling for fund and general board characteristics I investigate the
relation between individual characteristics of board members and the board governance. I further
investigate the impact of the 2000 regulation change (i.e. board independence and nominating
committee) and independent chairman on fund governance introduced by 2004 regulation
change.
I find that funds with larger boards and higher board independence display better
governance ability. However, the results suggest that besides the general composition of the
board, the individual characteristics of members also matter. Shareholders benefit from the
expertise of members with higher tenure and a finance background. However, funds that pay
higher compensation are likely to have higher advisory fees suggesting that high compensation
reduces the effectiveness of board governance.
The effectiveness of the 2000 regulation change that increased the board independence
was criticized since a significant number of funds already exceeded the required minimum
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independent rate. Using a subset of funds that experience increase in independence around the
regulation change of 2000, I find that governance improved as a result of increasing board
independence. However, I do not similar improvement for the possible target funds that have less
than 65% independence. Thus, the effect of the regulation change on board independence is
limited. Funds that created separate nominating committee displayed more effective governance.
The independent board chairman clause of 2004 is criticized by practitioners due to the lack of
empirical evidence to support the contribution of such clause. The results do not suggest that
having an independence chairman directly improves the board governance. However, the
expertise of the chairman (i.e. tenure) is likely to improve his or her influence on fund
governance.
Finally the control variables deserve some brief comments. Results indicate that the
boards benchmark to the objective average management fee while setting the advisory fee.
However, this does not always work for the shareholders best interest. Performance improvement
alone does not lead to higher rent transfer but the funds that beat their peers significantly tend to
increase the advisory fee.
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TABLES
Table 7 Definition of the Variables

Name
Fund specific factors and
Adviser size

Source

Fund size

NSAR-B

Adviser Size

CRSP

Turnover

NSAR-B

Rate of reimbursement

NSAR-B

FFAR

CRSP

Definition
Natural log of fund size reported under 74T measured in millions of
dollar
Total Net Asset of all funds managed by the same adviser listed in a
year in millions of dollar
Lowest of the purchase or sales divided by the weighted average
assets
Dollar value of reimbursement divided by weighted total fund assets
Fama French four factor adjusted returns

Number of shareholder account

NSAR-B

As reported under 74X in thousands of account

Administrative costs

NSAR-B

Natural log of administrative cost reported under 72G

Market factors
Objective Herfindahl

CRSP

Herfindahl Index of fund objective

SAI

Difference between the objective fee and fund management fee

Board Size

SAI

Number of directors sitting on the fund board

Board Independence

SAI

Number of independent directors divided by total number of
directors

Independent Board Chairman

SAI

D=1 if board chairman is independent director

Fee Difference

General Board Character.

Director Characteristics
Adviser Fund Occupied

SAI – CRSP

Median fund number independent members occupy divided by the
total number of funds managed by the adviser in CRSP

Median Tenure

SAI

Median of the tenure of independent directors

Other directorship

SAI

Percentage of directors sitting at least on one board other than funds
managed by the adviser

Background

SAI

Percentage of directors who has finance, law or education
background

Fund Compensation

SAI

Median compensation independent members receive for sitting on
the fund board

Nominating committee exist

SAI

D=1 if independent nominating committee exists

Nominating committee meeting

SAI

Number of nominating committee meetings
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Table 8 Descriptive Statistics

Panel A
Variables

N

Mean

Med.

25th

75th

Adviser Fee (basis)
Fund Size ($ million)
Adviser size ($ million)
Turnover
Adjusted return
Admin. Fee ($ thousand)
Number of accounts
% reimbursement
fee difference (basis points)

1336
1352
1477
1355
1422
1342
1323
1323
1409

73.20
243.72
9,318.99
96.40
-1.21%
14.86
6,999
0.22%
3.09

73.59
269.70
14,343.76
67.00
-1.21%
5.48
10,886
0.00%
5.43

60.00
71.05
2,264.09
36.00
-6.95%
1.00
1,913
0.00%
1.41

85.00
881.84
51,369.51
115.00
3.86%
185.00
38,949
4.97%
25.41

Panel B
Variables

N

Mean

Med.

25th

75th

number of seat
% independent dir.
tenure median
% median fun occu.
% finance back.
% education back.
% law back.
% other director.
$ fund seat compen.

1326
1326
1321
1296
1326
1326
1326
1325
1207

8.08
74.72%
6.88
66.31%
23.87%
10.97%
6.46%
52.04%
3,823

8.00
75.00%
6.00
76.92%
20.00%
0.00%
0.00%
50.00%
2,114

6.00
66.67%
4.00
37.50%
10.00%
0.00%
0.00%
25.00%
1,111

10.00
83.33%
9.00
100.00%
33.33%
20.00%
14.29%
77.78%
4,400

Panel C
Variables

N

1

0

≥1

None

chair independent
separate indep. nominating comm
depen. dir. Comp.
incl.fin.back. member
incl.edu back. member
incl.law back. member

1320
393
1320
1326
1326
1326

19.92%
78.12%
25.38%

80.08%
21.88%
74.62%
77.98%
45.78%
30.54%

22.02%
54.22%
69.46%
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Table 9 Whole Sample Set and Subset Board Independence

Period

N

Mean

Med.

t values

p values

whole sample set
1996-2000
2001-2004

771
555

73.22%
76.60%

75.00%
75.00%

-2.72

0.000

402
316

71.28%
79.51%

71.43%
79.29%

-4.94

0.000

296
236

71.26%
77.41%

72.72%
76.92%

-2.81

0.003

161
127

58.90%
66.01%

57.85%
66.67%

-4.02

0.000

369
239

75.71%
72.44%

75.00%
71.32%

2.10

0.019

475
319

76.44%
73.46%

75.00%
75.00%

1.63

0.0525

increase in mean independence
1996-2000
2001-2004
increase in independence
between 99-01
1996-2000
2001-2004
Independence below 65% at
2000
1996-2000
2001-2004
no increase in mean
independence
1996-2000
2001-2004
no increase in independence
between 99-01
1996-2000
2001-2004
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Table 10 Advisory Fee - General Board and Member Characteristics

Variables
Fund Specific Factors

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

-0.96**
(0.02)

-0.90**
(0.03)

-0.87**
(0.03)

-0.97**
(0.02)

-1.21***
(0.00)

-1.18***
(0.00)

0.58*
(0.07)

0.64**
(0.05)

0.80**
(0.02)

0.77**
(0.02)

1.38***
(0.00)

1.39***
(0.00)

Turnover

-1.53E-04
(0.90)

4.86E-04
(0.84)

-1.09E-04
(0.96)

-0.01
(0.62)

-2.21E-04
(0.35)

-0.002
(0.35)

Rate of Reimbursement

7.13E-04
(0.72)

-1.08E-03
(0.61)

-1.13E-03
(0.59)

-1.53E-03
(0.47)

0.786E-03
(0.79)

0.748E-03
(0.80)

Number of Accounts

-0.40
(0.22)

-0.41
(0.21)

-0.44
(0.17)

-0.34
(0.29)

-0.54*
(0.10)

-0.52
(0.12)

Administrative Cost

-0.07
(0.63)

-0.01
(0.92)

0.02
(0.87)

0.05
(0.72)

0.16
(0.28)

0.15
(0.30)

Adjusted Return

1.23
(0.36)

1.19
(0.38)

0.88
(0.52)
2.20**
(0.02)

2.76***
(0.00)

2.80***
(0.00)

Fund Size
Adviser size

Spread b/w Objective

Market Specific Factors
Objective Herfindahl

-0.04
(0.26)

-0.04
(0.27)

-0.03
(0.51)

-0.02
(0.66)

-2.56E-03
(0.95)

-0.01
(0.77)

Fee Difference

-66.19
(0.43)

-159.38*
(0.08)

-155.45*
(0.08)

-167.39*
(0.055)

-151.06*
(0.07)

-146.73*
(0.08)

Board size

-0.19
(0.17)

-0.3**
(0.05)

-0.31**
(0.03)

-0.39***
(0.01)

-0.39***
(0.01)

Board Independence

-4.96*
(0.08)

-5.97**
(0.03)

-4.90*
(0.08)

-6.03**
(0.03)

-5.71**
(0.05)

Chair Independent

0.92
(0.32)

1.17
(0.21)

1.25
(0.23)

1.7*
(0.08)

2.04**
(0.04)

General Board Characteristics

-0.21*
(0.07)

Independent Chair Tenure
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Continued

Director Characteristic
1.49
(0.26)

1.55
(0.23)

1.71
(0.19)

1.67
(0.20)

-0.18**
(0.03)

-0.17**
(0.04)

-0.14*
(0.08)

-0.05
(0.73)

-1.75
(0.12)

-1.67
(0.14)

-1.68
(0.14)

-4.35**
(0.05)

-4.10*
(0.07)

-4.11*
(0.07)

Law Background

-0.24
(0.95)

-1.89
(0.62)

-1.56
(0.68)

Education Background

6.72**
(0.02)

2.66
(0.36)

3.09
(0.29)

.08
169

0.9E-04*
(0.06)
.07
168

1.0E-04*
(0.06)
.08
168

Adviser Fund Occupied
Tenure
Other Director
Finance Background

Fund Compensation
R2
Number of funds

.05
175

.10
169

.07
169

***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. p values are given in parenthesis.
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Table 11 Panel Models of Nominating Committee

Variables
Fund Specific Characteristics
Fund Size
Adviser size
Turnover
Rate of Reimbursement
Adjusted Return
Number of Accounts
Administrative Cost

Model 1

Model 2

-1.13
(0.15)
-2.91***
(0.00)
0.014***
(0.01)
-6.9E-04
(0.94)
4.15*
(0.09)
0.20
(0.83)
0.04
(0.87)

-0.15
(0.85)
-1.5*
(0.08)
0.007
(0.18)
-3.05E-03
(0.71)
2.01
(0.41)
-0.77
(0.39)
-0.19
(0.46)

-0.02
(0.62)
-305.76**
(0.03)

-0.04
(0.27)
-163.93
(0.38)

-0.57***
(0.00)
-7.85**
(0.05)
-1.36
(0.26)
-1.94*
(0.08)

-0.65***
(0.00)
-2.47
(0.64)
-1.41
(0.40)

Market Specific Factors
Objective Herfindahl
Fee Difference

General Board Characteristics
Board size
Board Independence
Chair Independent
Nominating Committee Exits

-0.05
(0.61)

Nomi. Comm. Meetings
R2
N

.22
136

***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. p values are given in parenthesis.
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.21
112

Table 12 Subsets of Increase in Board Independence Around Regulation Change
Variables

Increase in mean board independence
1995-2004
1995-1999
2000-2004

Increase in board independence b/w 99-01
1995-2004
1995-1999
2000-2004

Independence below 65 % at 2000
1995-2004
1995-1999
2000-2004

-2.08***
(0.00)
2.22***
(0.00)
7.43E-04
(0.74)
-3.44E-04
(.0.91)
-0.27
(0.89)
-0.02
(0.97)
0.14
(0.37)

-2.03***
(0.00)
0.95
(0.17)
1.97E-03
(0.50)
-0.002
(0.38)
-1.09
(0.60)
1.13**
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.92)

-1.95**
(0.02)
0.52
(0.61)
-4.16E-04
(0.94)
0.017*
(0.07)
6.30***
(0.01)
-1.02
(0.27)
0.06
(0.82)

-2.02***
(0.00)
3.32***
(0.00)
-4.14E-04
(0.85)
8.38E-04
(0.78)
0.79
(0.68)
-0.32
(0.45)
-0.24
(0.18)

-1.16*
(0.10)
1.22
(0.18)
1.18E-03
(0.68)
-8.98E-04
(0.74)
0.11
(0.96)
0.83
(0.08)
-0.63***
(0.00)

-1.38
(0.19)
1.01
(0.45)
-4.35E-03
(0.55)
0.02*
(0.06)
1.38
(0.57)
-1.35
(0.23)
0.32
(0.35)

2.72**
(0.04)
0.92
(0.38)
-6.58E-03*
(0.09)
0.02
(0.20)
11.60**
(0.02)
-4.28***
(0.00)
-1.21***
(0.00)

-3.18**
(0.05)
2.83**
(0.03)
-9.4E-04
(0.84)
-7.5E-03
(0.64)
-0.06
(0.98)
2.81**
(0.05)
-1.05***
(0.08)

0.30
(0.90)
3.61
(0.21)
0.02
(0.25)
0.01
(0.51)
13.73*
(0.07)
-2.98
(0.32)
-0.07
(0.93)

0.01
(0.91)
-262.42*
(0.06)

-0.10
(0.15)
-224.70
(0.21)

0.001
(0.96)
-21.88
(0.91)

0.002
(0.98)
-42.70
(0.78)

-0.07
(0.36)
-32.33
(0.86)

0.05
(0.43)
-153.00
(0.52)

-0.08
(0.56)
-689.21**
(0.03)

-0.19
(0.21)
-250.07
(0.55)

-0.19
(0.40)
-722.95*
(0.08)

-0.20
(0.23)
-7.08**
(0.02)
2.00**
(0.04)
1.04E-04**
(0.03)
.01
85

0.41
(0.14)
-6.00
(0.18)
4.29**
(0.02)
1.83E-04***
(0.00)
.04
80

-0.01
(0.97)
-7.62*
(0.08)
0.92
(0.49)
-3.92E-05
(0.50)
.15
85

-0.53***
(0.00)
-12.00***
(0.00)
3.02**
(0.01)
-4.28E-06
(0.94)
.01
61

-0.02
(0.95)
0.43
(0.95)
5.40**
(0.02)
-0.46*
(0.08)
.01
57

-0.02
(0.93)
-18.79***
(0.00)
2.35
(0.16)
-4.86E-05
(0.47)
.01
61

-0.67
(0.28)
10.48
(0.18)
2.18
(0.45)
0.65E-04
(0.74)
.28
35

0.52
(0.50)
-10.54
(0.49)
n/a
n/a
-1.6E-04
(0.47)
.20
34

-1.31
(0.13)
14.08
(0.15)
n/a
n/a
-0.86E-04
(0.85)
.14
34

Fund Specific Charac.
Fund Size
Adviser size
Turnover
Rate of Reimbursement
Adjusted Return
Number of Accounts
Administrative Cost
Market Spec. Factor
Objective Herfindahl
Fee Difference
Board Charac
Board size
Board Independence
Chair Independent
Fund Compensation
R2
N

***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. p values are given in parenthesis.
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PART 3. DETERMINANTS OF SOFT DOLLAR ARRANGEMENTS; DO
SHAREHOLDERS BENEFIT?
3.1 Introduction

The scope of services provided to fund advisers by brokers is often not limited to the
execution of securities transactions. The arrangements with the brokers could include additional
products or services such as the sale of fund shares, the receipt of investment research and
statistical information, the receipt of quotations for portfolio valuations. Section 28(e) that was
enacted as part of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 permits the adviser to transfer a
premium to brokers for these additional services35 under “soft dollar arrangements” requiring the
adviser to disclose if such arrangements exist. In soft dollar arrangements, the adviser obtains
additional services from a selected broker besides transaction execution paying more than the
lowest available rates. The total rent transfer from the adviser to the broker includes a premium
for additional services as well as the cost of execution of securities transactions.
The use of soft dollar arrangements and the number of firms that provide research and
other services in exchange for soft dollars has been growing since the arrangement was created
in 1975. Greenwich Associates reported in 1996 that 71% of the total transaction executions
involve some form of soft dollar arrangements (Wirth 1997). Livingstone and O’Neal (1996)
suggest that a substantial amount of brokerage commissions are payments for research services
rather than for execution. In its 1998 report on soft dollars, the SEC notes that almost the entire
industry adopts some type of soft dollar arrangement and estimates that commissions for
35

I use the term “additional services” rather than “research” because although most of the products purchased by
soft dollar are research related advisers also obtain mixed use services such as reports and non-research products
such as pricing services and trade assistance services.
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research products as a result of soft dollar arrangements adds up to 30-50% of the total brokerage
expenses. Furthermore, the SEC reports that the total amount was approximately 1.4 billion
dollar in 1998. Conrad et al. (2001) note that on average 60% of the soft dollar commissions are
paid for research service. Although, the soft dollar has been receiving some publicity for over a
decade, the research on these arrangements and their overall implications on shareholder’s
wealth are very limited.36
Based on his or her considerations on the necessary brokerage services, the adviser
simultaneously decides the broker participation and determines the structure of arrangements to
obtain these services from selected brokers. The disproportionate nature of taking on the total
cost of research and additional services, and their benefit creates incentives for the adviser to
engage in soft dollar arrangements (Horan and Johnsen 2004). The degree of soft dollar use
indicates how much of the total brokerage services the adviser chooses to obtain in the bundled
form. In bundled form, the adviser receives basic transaction execution and the additional
services together making an aggregate payment for all. Eventually, the arrangements reflect the
scale and scope of the brokerage services as well as the extent of soft dollar use. However, as
Blume (1993) documents soft dollar arrangements often lead institutional managers to use
brokers that they ordinarily would not employ. Thus, if the adviser manages the brokerage
services strategically, the ex ante considerations should be reflected in the ex post broker
participation and arrangements for brokerage services. Such a strategy should lead to
minimization of brokerage commissions while optimizing the use of soft dollar arrangements.
No relation between considerations and broker participation would suggest that either the adviser

36

See Livingstone and O’Neal (1996), Brennan and Chordia (1993), Ambachtsheer (1993) and Blume (1993)
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does not follow a strategy for the management of brokerage services or management of
brokerage services is distorted by the agency conflict between the shareholders, the adviser, and
the brokers, leading to results not optimal for the best interest of the shareholders.
The bundling of services under the soft dollar arrangements are expected to provide two
benefits to the shareholders. First, shareholders should expect to have better returns for their
investments as a result of the additional services. Second, shareholders should pay a lower
advisory fee since the cost of research and other additional services are paid as a brokerage
commission, which otherwise would be part of the advisory fee and reflected in the expense
ratio.
Using a survivorship bias free sample of 432 equity funds over the 5 years period of 1999
to 2003, I investigate how the adviser’s ex ante considerations on broker’s participation and the
characteristics of the relations between the adviser and the brokers affect the ex post level of soft
dollar use and the cost of brokerage services. In other words, I study whether the adviser
strategically manages soft dollar use and the cost of brokerage services based on ex ante factors.
I also investigate whether advisers that obtain additional services under soft dollar arrangements
are better in capturing the returns and provide a benefit to shareholders from a reduction in
advisory fees.
I find that the adviser’s management of soft dollar use and cost of brokerage services are
not arbitrary. They reflect the adviser’s considerations for broker participation. Brokerage fees
and soft dollar use decline if the adviser considers transaction execution related services, such as
obtaining the best price as a consideration for broker participation. Thus, the adviser successfully
induces the brokers to minimize the cost of transaction execution. Soft dollar use increases if
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additional services, such as research, are considered in determining the broker participation. The
shareholders benefit from better returns and a declining advisory fee as soft dollar use increases.
However, results suggest that the premium paid for the additional services are detrimental to
shareholders’ wealth.
Section 1 discusses the variables and hypotheses. Section 2 provides information on the
data and methodology. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics and discusses empirical results.
Section 4 discusses the limitations. Section 5 presents results of additional tests. Section 6
concludes.
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3.2 Hypotheses

The management of brokerage services would initially involve the determination of the
broker participation based on ex ante considerations and the management of related contracts and
business relations with participating brokers. Non-arbitrary management of soft dollar
arrangements and brokerage services is essential to optimize the benefit of the additional services
obtained through soft dollar arrangements and minimize the total brokerage commissions. Thus,
if the management of brokerage services is not arbitrary, I should observe the soft dollar use
being strategically determined reflecting the ex ante considerations and related contracts between
the adviser and the brokers.

3.2.1. Considerations for Broker Participation

Funds disclose in the NSAR which of the following considerations affect the
participation of brokers or dealers or other entities in commissions or other compensation paid on
portfolio transactions of the fund:
•

Sales of funds shares.

•

Receipt of investment research and statistical information.

•

Receipt of quotations for portfolio valuations.

•

Ability to execute portfolio transactions to obtain best price and execution.

•

Receipt of telephone line and wire services.

If the adviser strategically determines the low cost, high quality brokers to improve fund
performance and attempts to minimize the brokerage commissions, then I should observe the ex
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ante considerations being reflected on ex post degree of soft dollar use and the total cost of
brokerage commissions. A broker base that is determined based on mostly transaction execution
related considerations, such as “obtain best price and execution”, should lead to lower brokerage
commission and soft dollar premiums, and require less soft dollar use. Soft dollar use should
increase if the services and research that mostly serve to improve portfolio management and
induce information motivated transaction are considerations for broker participation. Moreover,
increase in soft dollar use would lead to higher commissions due to the premium paid for the
services and research and higher cost of excess amount of transaction.

3.2.2. Broker Base and Fund Characteristics
3.2.2.1. Concentration of broker base.

Following the determination of the broker participation based on the considerations, the
adviser allocates the total brokerage service demand to the brokers. A more concentrated
brokerage base indicates that the adviser obtains most of the brokerage services from a smaller
number of brokers. If the adviser successfully chooses these brokers in order to minimize the
cost of brokerage services then a more concentrated broker base should lead to obtaining
transaction execution at fairer prices. Since the additional services are the products of the brokers
as well, a similar negative relation would exist between a more concentrated broker base and the
premium paid for the additional services. However, the effect of obtaining the additional services
at a fairer price on the soft dollar use is not clear a priori. The adviser might revise and increase
the soft dollar use in order to benefit from low premiums paid for the additional services or
choose not to alter the predetermined amount of necessary research and information, leading to a
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lower percentage of soft dollar use (less soft dollar commissions within total brokerage
commissions).

3.2.2.2. The institutional relations with the brokers

While determining the terms of the contracts the adviser would distinguish between the
brokers based on the characteristics such as their quality or affiliation with the broker in order to
minimize the cost of the services and the soft dollar arrangements. Thus, the scale and scope of
brokerage services therefore the cost of these services would reflect the effects of such
characteristics. Funds report in their NSAR whether they hold securities of their regular brokers
that derive more than 15% of gross revenue. Holding the securities of a brokerage house could
signal the adviser’s opinion on the quality of the broker. If a broker is most likely to be
considered as a better quality broker if he or she provides the services at fairer prices then the
funds that hold the securities of their major brokers should be receiving the brokerage services at
fairer prices.
Funds also report in the NSAR whether they have an affiliated broker. Popular press
recently argues that unaffiliated brokers favor funds that pay them more. In 2004, the SEC
passed a proposal that outlaws the practice of directed brokerage. Recently PIMCO settled a
legal suit for engaging in arrangements that required the brokers to “tout PIMCO mutual funds,
via placement on intranet web sites or ‘preferred or ‘recommended’ lists”.37 Thus, affiliated
brokers could provide the services at a lower cost and be favored at the allocation of brokerage
services.

37

As cited by Christoffersen et al. (2005) http://ag.co.gov/newsalerts/2004/04-105.htm
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3.2.2.3. Alternative rent transfers

The brokerage commissions and soft dollar premiums are not the only forms of rent
transfers to the brokers. Total rent transfers through brokerage services are likely to be affected
by commission rebalances and rent transfers through other channels such as loads and 12b-1
fees. Funds report if there is an “arrangement to return or credit part of all of the commissions or
profits to the adviser or the fund”. Such arrangement indirectly serves the purpose of rebalancing
the rent transfer between the shareholders and the brokers. Therefore, the initial amount of soft
dollar arrangements may be larger if such an arrangement of commission return exists.
Nevertheless, total rent transfer to the brokers has to be enough to create an incentive for the
brokers to maintain a supply of the services. The brokers could be compensated by part of the
front end loads and 12b-1 fees. If there is a rent transfer to the broker through these alternative
channels, the broker is likely to provide transaction execution and additional brokerage services
at a lower cost, thus the adviser engages in higher amount of soft dollar use.

3.2.2.4 Fund characteristics

Larger funds may obtain lower commissions as a percent of total assets or since the fixed
component of commissions is allocated over a larger amount of assets. Larger shareholder base
leading to larger redemption of shares would increase the fund turnover. Therefore, fund
management would engage in a higher amount of regular transaction execution that would
increase the total brokerage commissions. However, such transactions would not require the use
of services provided under soft dollar arrangements. Thus, the soft dollar use, the proportion of
bundled services through soft dollar arrangements within the total brokerage service, should
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decline as the proportion of transaction execution not motivated by the information and services
increase.
Finally, funds of certain objectives are more likely to demand additional services.
Livingstone and O’Neal (1996) suggest that international funds have high r brokerage expense.
However, they do not make any indication on the relation between the soft dollar use and the
fund objective. International funds, small cap funds and funds that specialize in a particular
sector might allocate higher proportion of brokerage commission under soft dollar arrangements.

3.2.3. Do Shareholders Benefit?
3.2.3.1. Fund Returns and Soft Dollar Use

Shareholders should benefit from better fund performance as the soft dollar use increases
since additional services and research should improve the portfolio management.
The informed investors profit more from their private information if less of the
information is incorporated into prices by nonclient members (Livne and Trueman (2002)). The
information obtained through the soft dollar arrangement is less likely to be diffused to the prices
by traders that do not have the information. The less diffused information obtained through soft
dollar arrangements motivates the adviser to trade more and possibility profit more. While the
positive impact of more precise information is obvious for the adviser, as Brennan and Chordia
(1993) argue, high quality information also provides higher revenue to the seller of information
(i.e. the broker). However, the quality of the research and other services obtained under soft
dollar arrangements is not homogeneous so the impact of soft dollar use is likely to vary between
different advisers. Brennan and Chordia suggest that the amount of trading done by the
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information purchaser could be a proxy for the quality of the information. Thus, the advisers that
obtain higher quality of information and additional services would engage in greater amounts of
transaction per soft dollar commission leading to better performance.
Carhart (1997) finds that transaction costs describe most of the unexplained mutual fund
performance. Thus, following Carhart, I expect fund performance to decrease as the cost of
turnover increases. Finally, following the evidence of Chen et al. (2004) I expect larger funds to
underperform smaller funds.
A positive relation between the adjusted fund return and the soft dollar use does not
necessarily imply that the overall impact of the soft dollar use would be beneficial to
shareholders wealth. Although, the fund return improves as soft dollar use increases, the cost of
additional services and research might exceed the improvement in fund performance and be
detrimental to the overall wealth of shareholders.

3.2.3.2. The Advisory Fee and Soft Dollar Use

The second benefit of soft dollar arrangements to the shareholders is the decrease in the
advisory fee. Shareholders should expect a reduction in the advisory fee as soft dollar use
increases since the cost of research is paid by the shareholders under the brokerage commissions,
which otherwise would be part of the advisory fee. However, the cost of outsourced services and
research could be higher than the cost incurred when they are provided by the adviser. Moreover,
Conrad et al (2001) document that the transaction fee is higher for soft dollar brokers. Therefore,
an increase in soft dollar use does not directly imply that the shareholders bear less cost when
these services are outsourced. Livingstone and O’Neal (1996) document no trade off between
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brokerage commission per trade and the expense ratio and suggest that the shareholders do not
benefit from soft dollar arrangements through a reduction in advisory fees. Moreover, the SEC
notes in a 1995 report that “Soft dollar practices also diminish the ability of a client to evaluate
the expense it incurs in obtaining portfolio management services and may hinder the ability of
the client to negotiate fee arrangements.” The SEC argues that the problem arises due to limited
disclosure. Thus, the overall implication of soft dollar use on shareholder wealth through the
decline in advisory fee is not clear. A negative relation would indicate that the shareholders
benefit from advisory fee decrease as the amount of commission including the premium for
additional services and research paid under soft dollar arrangements (i.e. soft dollar fee)
increases. A positive relation or no significant relation instead would indicate that shareholders’
wealth does not necessarily improve through a decline in advisory fees.
The literature documents evidence of a relation between advisory fee and fund size,
adviser size and turnover (Deli 2002). Deli also controls for reimbursed expenses in his model. I
also control for the number of accounts since the higher redemption of shares and managing a
larger number of shareholder accounts is likely to increase the cost of portfolio management.
Moreover, funds compete with other funds in the same objective to attract prospective
shareholders. In order to capture the effect of market dynamics and the competition within the
objective I control for the concentration of assets within the objective. Deli documents a higher
advisory fee for international funds. In addition to that, I also control for small cap and
specialized funds.
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3.3 Data and Methodology

Disclosure of the amount of soft dollars and the amount of transaction that soft dollars are
involved are not mandated by SEC. To construct the sample, I randomly select actively managed
equity funds from CRSP Survivorship Free Mutual Fund Database after excluding index funds
and multiple classes of the same fund. Initial screening of randomly selected equity funds reveals
that two third of the funds report the dollar amount of the soft dollar commission paid to obtain
services other than transaction execution. Funds that report zero soft dollar commissions are
taken as having no soft dollar arrangements and excluded from the final sample set. My data are
limited to equity funds because the use of soft dollars among fixed-income and OTC equity
transactions was almost stopped after the SEC found that the Section 28(e) that introduced the
soft dollar does not apply to dealer transactions for these groups.38 Index funds are eliminated
because these funds are not actively managed. Funds are grouped according to their objectives as
defined in the CRSP database. Since CRSP does not distinguish between foreign and domestic
funds, international funds are determined based on the information provided in the fund proxy.
The weight of each objective in the sample set is determined based on the weight of the objective
in the whole population of equity funds in CRSP database. The final sample set covers a 5-years
period from 1999 to 2003 and consists of 432 equity funds managed by 129 different advisers.
1999 was picked as the beginning year, since less than half of the randomly selected funds
disclose the dollar amount of soft dollar commissions prior to 1999.

38

I controlled the proxies and found that during the sample period almost all fixed income securities funds report
zero soft dollar commission.
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The dollar amount of the soft dollar commissions and total brokerage commissions are
collected from the funds’ SAI. The rest of the data are collected from the funds’ NSAR. It is
possible that the advisers who are more successful at using the services obtained by the soft
dollar arrangements are more likely to disclose the information. In order to determine whether
the lack of uniform disclosure leads to selection bias, I conduct a Heckman sample selection bias
test with all screened funds, including the funds that do not disclose information. The results fail
to reject the null hypothesis of no selection bias and are robust to treating the funds that report
zero soft dollar commissions as having no soft dollar arrangements. Another concern could be
that the large fund families such as Fidelidity are likely to appear more frequently in the sample
set. However, since a fund family that has higher weight in the industry is more likely to
influence the industry norms, such characteristic of a randomly selected sample set would be
only reflective of the whole population of mutual funds.
Conrad et al (2001) document that the transaction commission is higher for soft dollar
brokers. However, my analysis on soft dollar use is not affected by this phenomenon since the
dependent variable is not the commission per trade but the dollar amount of brokerage
commissions paid under soft dollar arrangements divided by the total dollar amount of brokerage
commissions. Thus, if the total brokerage commissions indicates the cost of the aggregate
brokerage services necessary for the management of the fund, the dependent variable attempts to
capture the degree of the soft dollar use indicating the amount of the brokerage services the fund
management decides to bundle with additional services.
Livingston and O’Neal (1996) note that the sells are likely to be higher than buys at times
of high redemption and decreasing fund assets. Likewise, buys are likely to be more than sells at
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times of asset inflow. Therefore, the turnover reported in fund NSAR does not exactly reflect the
total transaction that is necessary for fund management and understates the total assets traded. I
calculate the fund turnover as the sum of the purchases and sales reported in NSAR divided by
the weighted average value of the portfolio. Funds with high turnover also bear the market
impact cost of transaction besides the brokerage commissions. However, Berkowitz et al. (1988)
argue that market impact cost is small relative to commissions and concludes that there is no
economic trade-off between market impact cost and commissions. Chan and Lakonishok (1993)
suggest no correlation between market impact cost and brokerage commission. Thus, following
Livingstone and O’Neal’s (1996) model I do not control for market impact cost.
Advisers report the total amount of brokerage commission as well as the amounts paid to
the first 10 brokers. Thus, it is possible to estimate the concentration of the brokerage services
(i.e. broker base). A Herfindahl index of the brokerage commissions paid to the top 10 broker is
calculated to obtain the brokerage service concentration. The calculation of the brokerage base’s
Herfindahl index h( I , i ) is as follows:
⎛
⎜ A
h( I , i ) = ∑ ⎜ k
k∈I ⎜ ∑ A j
⎝ j∈I

Where

2

⎞
⎟
⎟ ( j = 1,2,...,10)
⎟
⎠

(9)

Ak
is the brokerage commission received by broker k relative to the total
∑ Aj
j∈I

broker commission paid by the adviser39.

39

I also calculated the concentration of brokerage base following the method Deli (2002) uses to calculate the
convexity of fee schedule, where the difference between the highest and the lowest fee level divided by the applied
fee. Test results are qualitatively similar.
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Two major alternative rent transfers to the brokers and dealers are front end load and
12b-1 fees. Although, in the literature front end loads and 12b-1 fees tend to be considered as
rent transfer only to the brokers and other sales forces, not all front-end loads and 12b-1 fees are
received by the brokers. Actual load payments reported in the funds’ NSARs bear little
resemblance to the maximum load fees that are widely reported and used in academic research
(Christoffersen et al. 2005). The NSAR’s decomposition of loads and 12b-1 fees allows me to
determine the actual dollar amount of front end load received by the captive sales force and
unaffiliated brokers as well as 12b-1 fees received solely by the brokers.40 Captive brokers are
brokers affiliated with the fund family, whereas unaffiliated do not represent any fund family.
The percent of the front end load received by the brokers is the sum of the front end load paid to
the captive sales force and unaffiliated brokers (Questions 32 and 33 in NSAR) in dollars divided
by the total weighted assets. The 12b-1 fee paid solely to brokers and dealers is the dollar amount
of 12b-1 payment received by brokers and dealers (Question 42D in NSAR) divided by the total
weighted assets. Total compensation through alternative channels is the sum of the front end load
and 12b-1 fee paid to brokers.
Soft dollar use, SDU, is regressed against the quantitative and dummy variables in
equation (2)
SDU i ,t =
ln wfundi ,t + toi ,t + brconi ,t + brstci ,t + affii ,t + credi ,t + salesi ,t + quoi ,t

(10)

+exei ,t + teli ,t + resi ,t + altcompi ,t + int i ,t + sci ,t + spi ,t + ei ,t

Where

40

NSAR also reports the front end load retained by the adviser or 12b-1 fees paid to clients such as underwriters,
sales personnel, banks etc.
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SDUi,t

= soft dollar commissions for fund i in year t divided by the total brokerage
commissions for fund i in year t.

lnwfundi,t = natural log of weighted average assets
toi,t

= sum of purchases and sales divided by weighted average assets

brconi,t

= brokerage service concentration

brstci,t

= one if fund holds securities of its regular brokers that derive more than 15% of
gross revenue

affii,t

= one if any broker or dealer is an affiliated person

credi,t

= one if there is an arrangement to return or credit part of all of commissions or
profits to the adviser or the fund

salesi,t

= one if sales of fund’s shares is a consideration for the participation of broker

quoi,t

= one if receipt of quotations for portfolio valuations is a consideration for the
participation of broker

exei,t

= one if ability to execute portfolio transactions to obtain best price and
execution valuations is a consideration for the participation of broker

teli,t

= one if receipt of telephone line and wire services is a consideration for the
participation of broker

resi,t

= one if receipt of investment research and statistical information is a
consideration for the participation of broker

altcompi,t = total front-end load and 12b-1 fee received by brokers or dealers
inti,t

= one if fund is an international fund

sci,t

= one if fund is a small company fund

spi,t

= one if fund is a special sector portfolio
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Equation (2) is also estimated for soft dollar fee and brokerage fee. Soft dollar fee is
calculated as the total soft dollar commissions divided by the total weighted average assets.
Brokerage fee is calculated as the total brokerage commissions divided by the total weighted
average assets.
Equation (3) investigates the first benefit shareholders expect from the use of soft dollar
arrangements. The equation tests whether fund performance improves as soft dollar use
increases.

FFARi ,t = SDUHATi ,t + ln pertri ,t + tr cos t i ,t + ln wfundi ,t −1 + toi ,t + sci ,t + int i ,t + spi ,t + ei ,t

(11)

The dependent variable of equation (2), soft dollar use (SDU) and the independent
variable of equation (2), turnover both enter the equation (3) as independent variables. Although
variance inflation factors (VIFs below 4) remain below the conventional cutoff line of ten
(Netter, Wasserman & Kutner 1985) and do not reveal any multicollinearity, in order to alleviate
the effect of possible multicollinearity between the control variables I estimate a more restricted
model using the non-stochastic component of soft dollar use, SDUHATi ,t , the fitted values that
are obtained from equation (2).
The dependent variable in equation (3) is Fama French four factor adjusted returns
where;

SDUHATi,t = the fitted values of soft dollar use obtained from equation (2).
lnpertri,t, =

the natural log of total soft dollar involved transaction divided by the soft

dollar commissions controls for the quality of information as suggested by Brennan and Chordia
(1993).
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trcosti,t

=

following Carhart (1997), brokerage commission for turning over the fund

portfolio once measured as the total brokerage commission divided by the fund turnover.
Keim and Madhavan (1998) find that commissions are affected by the share price. Thus,
the marginal dollar amount of transaction per soft dollar commission is likely to be affected by
the values of the securities in the underlying portfolio. However, some of the control variables in
my analyses should alleviate this problem. Specifically, the potential bias is minimized by using
Fama French adjusted returns controlling for the “high” versus “low”. I also include a dummy
for small cap funds and use the log normal transaction per soft dollar which captures the percent
change in transaction.
Following Carhart (1997), fund assets are lagged one year to avoid spurious correlation
(Granger and Newbold 1974). Furthermore, a reduced model excluding turnover is estimated in
order to test whether including turnover leads to biased results.
The shareholders could benefit from the use of higher quality services. Nevertheless, they
would still bear the cost of these additional services. Although, equation (3) investigates the
relation between the soft dollar use and the adjusted fund performance, it does not clearly capture
the effect of the cost of soft dollar arrangements on shareholders’ wealth. Equation (4) is
estimated in order to shed further light on the impact of the cost of soft dollar arrangements on
shareholder’s wealth.

FFARi ,t = SOFTFEEi ,t + ln pertri ,t + tr cos t i ,t + ln wfundi ,t −1 + toi ,t + sci ,t + int i ,t + spi ,t + ei ,t

(12)

Where, SOFTFEEi,t is the soft dollar fee calculated as the total soft dollar commissions
divided by the total weighted asset.
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Equation (5) investigates the second benefit shareholders expect from the use of soft
dollar arrangements. The equation tests whether the shareholders benefit from a reduction in
gross advisory fee as soft dollar use increases.
WADVi ,t =
SDUHATi ,t + ln wfund i ,t + ln advsz i ,t + toi ,t + ln accounti ,t + reimbi ,t + obherf i ,t

(13)

+ sci ,t + int i ,t + spi ,t + ei ,t

Where in addition to the variables defined above;

WADVi,t

= actual dollar amount of advisory fee paid by fund i in year t divided by the
weighted average portfolio of fund i in year t.

lnadvszi,t = natural log of adviser size calculated as the total asset of funds in CRSP
database managed by the same adviser.

lnaccounti,t= natural log of the number of shareholder accounts
reimbi,t

= dollar amount of reimbursement of the adviser divided by total fund size.

obherfi,t

= the Herfindahl index of the fund objective as a measure of the concentration
of the assets within the fund objective.

Restricted models are estimated in order to check whether the results are model specific
and affected from multicollinearity.
Although the advisory fee is expected to decrease as soft dollar use increases, equation
(6) is estimated in order to have a better understanding of the impact of the cost of soft dollar
arrangements, soft dollar fee, on the shareholders’ wealth.
WADVi ,t =
SOFTFEEi ,t + ln wfund i ,t + ln advszi ,t + toi ,t + ln spsz i ,t + ln accounti ,t + reimbi ,t
+ obherf i ,t + sci ,t + int i ,t + spi ,t + ei ,t
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(14)

The herfindahl index of the fund objective controls for the competition within the fund
objective in order to capture the objective characteristics. The calculation of the objective’s
Herfindahl index h( I , i ) is as follows:
⎛
⎜ A
h( I , i ) = ∑ ⎜ k
k∈I ⎜ ∑ A j
⎝ j∈I
Where

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠

2

(15)

Ak
is the share of net assets of fund k relative to the total net assets in the
∑ Aj
j∈I

objective.
Sutton (1991) shows that, over a broad class of oligopoly models, the number of market
participants and the variable part of the cost of the product are not necessarily related. Thus,
normalized Herfindahl indices are calculated following Luo’s (2002) method.
Specifically, the normalized Herfindahl index for category I in which fund i belong,
denoted hiI , is defined as:

hiI =

h( I , i )
−1
h c ( I , i)

(16)

Where h c ( I , i ) = 1 / N I ; N I denotes the number of funds in mutual fund category.
The normalized Herfindahl index characterizes the relative competitiveness of the
objective to which the fund belongs compared to the case where net assets are equally distributed
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among all funds within the objective. For example, it takes the value of one if there is one fund
in an objective.41

41

I repeated tests without normalizing the Herfindahl index. Results remained qualitatively similar.
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3.4 Empirical Analysis

3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics. Results indicate that on average 51% of
total brokerage commissions are paid under soft dollar arrangements. This result confirms SEC’s
soft dollar use estimation in its 1998 report.42 Total brokerage commissions are on average 40.85
basis points of funds’ total assets which 20.73 basis points are transferred as soft dollar
commissions for transaction execution and additional services bundled. Since the average fund
size is $161.36 million dollars, this suggests that an average equity fund transfers around
$334,000 to the brokers under soft dollar arrangements. In return, funds engage in $738.20 worth
of transaction for $1 of soft dollar commission. The average advisory fee is 79.19 basis points.43
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the dummy variables. 39.97% of the
funds hold securities of the brokers that generate more than 15% of their revenue and 28.75% of
the funds report that they have an affiliated broker or dealer. Thus, such characteristics of the
relation between the adviser and the broker are not limited to a small number of funds. Moreover
29.86% of the funds have an arrangement with at least one of their brokers or dealers in order to
return part of the commissions to the adviser indicating that additional contracts that would
directly affect the rent transfer between the adviser and the brokers are not limited to a marginal
group of funds. Almost all five groups of services listed in funds’ NSARs are reported by a
significant number of funds to be a consideration while deciding the broker participation. Among
42

SEC, 1998, Inspection report on the soft dollar practices of broker-dealers, investment advisers and mutual funds,
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/softdolr.htm
43

The literature documents average advisory fee for equity funds to be around 76.7 basis points (Deli 2002) thus the
sample set is representative of the equity funds.
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them, “providing research and information” is particularly important since it is considered as the
primary product obtained through soft dollar arrangements. 88.08% of the funds report that
receipt of investment research and statistical information influences their decision on broker
participation.

3.4.2 Brokerage Fee, Soft Dollar Use and Considerations of the Adviser in Broker
Participation

If the advisers are successful at strategically determining the brokerage participation that
would minimize the cost of brokerage services and the soft dollar premium then ex post
brokerage commission and the soft dollar use should be reflecting ex ante considerations of
adviser in determining the broker participation.
Results in Table 3 suggest that two of the factors listed in fund NSAR as a consideration
on broker participation, “sales of funds shares” and “ability to execute portfolio transactions to
obtain best price and execution” are negatively related to brokerage fee and soft dollar fee
indicating that the advisers are successful at selecting the brokers based on their ability to market
fund shares and execute transaction. This also indicates that while determining the broker
participation, the advisers compel the brokerage industry to be competitive on the cost of
marketing and trading service. The positive relation between the research dummy and the soft
dollar fee as well as the brokerage fee indicates that the advisers that consider the broker’s ability
to provide research and statistical services, mostly stated as the primary reason for soft dollar
arrangements, pay higher soft dollar fees and brokerage fees because of to the premiums paid for
additional services.
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Soft dollar use is negatively related to the considerations for broker participation of “best
price and execution” and “supplying communication service” (i.e. telephone line and wire
services). Thus, a brokerage base constructed with considerations mainly for regular transaction
execution does not lead to higher soft dollar use. However, soft dollar use increases if research,
the primary product fund obtains through soft dollar arrangements, is considered as a factor for
broker participation. Thus, the determination of broker participation by the adviser and soft
dollar use are not arbitrary. Advisers construct the broker base considering the soft dollar
agreements and in order to minimize the brokerage commissions. Regular transaction related
considerations lead to lower commissions and soft dollar use, whereas considerations mostly
related to the improvement of portfolio management (i.e. research) increase both the
commissions and soft dollar use.
Although, it is not a direct factor for improving fund management as research and
information, participation of the broker in the sale of fund shares is directly related with the soft
dollar use. However, if the sale of fund shares is a significant factor in the participation of the
broker and the sale force is also compensated by the front end loads and 12b-1 fees, it is possible
that brokers that are compensated through these alternative channels would provide the
additional services at a lower cost. However, I find the total rent transfer to brokers through front
end load and 12b-1 fees does not lead to the decrease of soft dollar fees. I interpret the result that
advisers make a distinction between the sales activity and rest of the brokerage services to some
degree. Furthermore, fund managements that are aggressive in marketing (i.e. select the brokers
considering the ability to sell shares) also tend to be aggressive in portfolio management. Such
managements are likely to allocate more soft dollars for research and additional services.
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3.4.3. Brokerage Fee, Soft Dollar Use and Broker Base

If the broker participation and soft dollar use are determined strategically as the results
above suggest then the allocation of the soft dollar arrangements and the demand for other
brokerage services among the participating brokers should reflect a similar structure. The
positive relation between soft dollar use and the broker concentration suggested by the results in
Table 3 indicates that a more concentrated broker base leads to more soft dollar use. However,
the positive relation between the soft dollar fee and brokerage concentration imply that
shareholders do not benefit from lower premiums. Furthermore, broker concentration and the
brokerage commissions are inversely related indicating that the more concentrated the broker
base of the fund is, the less brokerage commissions the shareholders pay. If the adviser
concentrates its brokerage service on a smaller number of brokers, the shareholders benefit from
relatively lower brokerage commissions but not necessarily lower premiums for additional
services. Thus, the advisers have incentives to favor certain brokerage houses over others in
order to reduce the cost of transaction executions. However, my results suggest that the advisers
transfer excess premium for the additional services. Nevertheless, the results do not rule out that
the higher soft dollar use is partially responsible for the positive relation between the soft dollar
fee and broker concentration.
Results in Table 3 indicate that the brokerage fee, soft dollar fee and soft dollar use
increase if there exists an agreement “to return or credit part of all of commissions or profits to
the adviser or the fund”. Such agreement gives the adviser the opportunity to rebalance the rent
transfer to its broker base. The adviser that would receive part of the commissions back may
accept to transfer higher amount of rent as brokerage commissions and soft dollar premiums.
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Funds that hold the securities of their brokers tend to have lower brokerage commissions.
Brokers might be compensating the adviser through lower brokerage commissions for holding
the securities of the brokerage house or simply brokerage houses that are successful at executing
transactions at a lower cost are taken by the advisers as successful institutions to invest.
However, results do not suggest that such optimism spills over to the decision of soft dollar use
since advisers that hold the securities of regular broker that derive more than 15% of gross
revenue of the fund neither engage in significantly higher soft dollar use nor pay less soft dollar
fee.
The positive relations between the affiliated broker dummy and both the soft dollar fee
and brokerage fee indicate that funds that are managed by an adviser that has an affiliated broker
pay higher commissions. Since there is no significant relation between the soft dollar use and the
existence of affiliated broker, the positive relation between the soft dollar fee and affiliated
broker dummy imply that the adviser indirectly compensates the affiliated brokers by
transferring excess rent as premiums of soft dollar arrangements which are not required for
disclosure. Courts have recently documented the unnecessary excess rent transfer to unaffiliated
brokers suggesting that similar services could be provided by the affiliated brokers at a lower
cost. However, Christoffersen et. al. (2005) suggest that the advisers favor affiliated brokers over
unaffiliated brokers for retaining assets that would otherwise leave the fund family Thus, the
positive relation between the existence of an affiliated broker and the brokerage commissions
suggest that such favoritism could lead to excess transaction execution by affiliated brokers that
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do not directly require additional services purchased through soft dollars and result in higher
brokerage commissions.44

3.4.4 Brokerage Fee, Soft Dollar Arrangements and Fund Characteristics

Table 3 summarizes how considerations for broker participation and the characteristics of
the broker base affect brokerage services. The dependent variable of the first model is the soft
dollar use. The dependent variable of the second model is the soft dollar fee. The dependent
variable of the last model in Table 3 is the brokerage fee.
Results confirm the findings of Livingstone and O’Neal (1996). Larger funds have not
only lower brokerage fee but also lower soft dollar fees. They may obtain lower commissions as
a percent of total assets. Moreover, the fixed component of commissions is allocated over a
larger amount of assets. Results do not suggest that larger funds differ in the soft dollar use.
Thus, the use of additional services through soft dollars is not limited to the funds of a specific
size. The positive relation between the turnover and the soft dollar fee as well as brokerage fee
indicates that higher turnover leads to higher brokerage fees and higher soft dollar fees.
However, the soft dollar use is negatively related with turnover suggesting that the percentage of
soft dollar transactions decrease as turnover increases. Hence, the results suggest that regular
transaction executions that are less likely to be motivated with services obtained through soft
dollar arrangements are responsible for higher levels of turnover. I do not find any significant
relation between sum of front end load and 12b-1 fee and brokerage commission or soft dollar

44

However, in further tests where dependent variable is the brokerage fee net of soft dollar fee (brokerage fee
mainly for transaction execution), I find no significant relation between brokerage fee and affiliated broker dummy.
Thus, soft dollar commissions are likely to be responsible for higher commissions if there exists an affiliated broker.
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use.45 Rent transfers to brokers through these channels do not affect the brokerage fee suggesting
that the distribution activity and its cost is managed independent from the brokerage services and
cost of brokerage services.
International funds have higher soft dollar fee suggesting that they pay higher premiums
for research and additional services in international markets. Shareholders of international funds
also bear higher brokerage fees confirming Livingstone and O’Neal (1996). However, they do
not engage in significantly higher soft dollar use. I interpret these results as international funds
allocating more of their brokerage commissions for regular transaction executions rather than
additional services through soft dollar arrangements possibly due to relatively higher transaction
costs in foreign markets.
Small cap funds have higher brokerage fee and lower soft dollar use implying that these
funds allocate most of their brokerage commission for regular transaction execution rather than
for additional services obtained through soft dollar arrangements. However, specialized funds
have lower brokerage fees and higher soft dollar use, indicating that they bundle more of their
brokerage service with additional services and pay lower brokerage commissions overall. Thus,
specialized funds may be using additional services in order to successfully determine strategic
transaction execution.

45

I also repeated the tests separating front end load and 12b-1 fees. I do not find any significant relation between
front end load and brokerage commission confirming Livingstone and O’Neal’s result. I also find no relation
between brokerage fees and the amount of 12b-1 fees paid solely to brokers or dealers.
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3.4.5. Adjusted Fund Returns and Soft Dollar

If the purpose of the additional services is to improve the portfolio management then the
shareholders should benefit from higher returns as a result soft dollar arrangements. The first
three models in Table 4 summarize the results of the relation between the Fama French four
factor adjusted returns and the soft dollar use. The positive result between the fund performance
and soft dollar use indicates that shareholders benefit from better returns as soft dollar use
increase after controlling for the quality of the information.46 Robustness check using the actual
rather than values of soft dollar use indicates the same positive relation between adjusted fund
performance and soft dollar use.47 The quality of information provided by the soft dollar
arrangement is directly related to the fund performance supporting the argument of Livne and
Trueman (2002) that informed investors profit more from their private information if less of the
information is incorporated into prices by nonclient members. There is some truth to the idea that
soft dollar arrangements are not homogeneous and the effectiveness of the arrangements depends
on the quality of the services and information obtained.
The last two models in Table 4 try to capture the impact of the cost of soft dollar
arrangements on the shareholders wealth. The negative relation between the soft dollar fee and
the fund performance imply that although performance improves as soft dollar use increases the
shareholders bear the cost of this improvement and their overall wealth is adversely affected.

46

I also checked for non-linear relation between the soft dollar use and adjusted fund performance. Although, results
suggest some degree of non-linearity, they are subject to model specification.

47

Nevertheless, this alternative model suffers from heterogeneity once turnover is included in the model as
discussed in methodology section.
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3.4.6. Advisory Fee and Soft Dollar Use

The advisory fee is solely the cost of fund management including the cost of research if it
is done by the adviser. When the research is outsourced under the soft dollar arrangement, the
cost of research and related services are paid under the brokerage fee instead of the advisory fee.
In this case the shareholders should expect to benefit from reduction in advisory fees.
The first three models in Table 5 investigate the relation between the gross advisory fee
and the soft dollar use. Results suggest that the increase in soft dollar use leads to a reduction in
the advisory fee. The last two models indicate that the soft dollar fee, total soft dollar
commissions divided by total fund assets, and the gross advisory fee are positively related,
inconsistent with the idea that shareholders who surrender part of their wealth for soft dollar
commissions benefit from a reduction in advisory fees. However, since I can not determine the
value added by the outsourced research I can not refute that the information provided by the
outside source could have higher quality therefore be more valuable. Nevertheless, results overall
suggest that although the advisory fee decreases as the adviser bundles more of the additional
services under soft dollar arrangements, a high amount of soft dollar arrangements is detrimental
for shareholders’ wealth.
Finally, the control variables deserve some brief comments. The results between the
control variables and the advisory fee confirm Deli’s (2002) findings. Larger funds and funds
that are managed by larger advisers have lower advisory fee. Funds with higher turnover have
higher advisory fee. Results suggest that the advisers are likely to rebalance the rent transfer
from shareholders for portfolio management through reimbursement. This indicates that since the
advisers could not predict the exact cost of portfolio management, they negotiate for a mark-up
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which they could rebalance at the end of the fiscal year. Results further suggest that small cap
domestic equity funds and international equity funds have higher advisory fee.
Overall, the results in Table 4 and Table 5 suggest that although shareholders benefit
from better fund performance and a reduction in advisory fee as soft dollar use increases, the
adviser bundles more of the brokerage service with additional services, the improvement comes
to the shareholders at a cost. The results suggest that shareholders wealth is adversely affected
from high amount of soft dollar arrangements. If the part of the brokerage commissions for
transaction execution is determined in a competitive brokerage industry as suggested by previous
results, then the undisclosed premium portion of the soft dollar commissions paid for the
additional services would be responsible for this adverse effect of soft dollar arrangements on
shareholders’ wealth.
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3.5 Further Tests and Robustness Checks

Table 6 summarizes the results of the models that provide further evidence to understand
the results documented in the previous tests. Results above suggest that more concentrated
broker base leads to lower brokerage commissions but higher soft dollar commissions. Yet, a
more concentrated broker base also leads to higher degree of soft dollar use. The results in Table
6 investigates whether besides the premium paid under soft dollar fee, the degree of soft dollar
use is likely to be partially responsible for the positive relation between broker concentration and
soft dollar fee. The first model in Table 6 is an indication that there is some truth to this
argument. After controlling for the degree of soft dollar use, broker concentration is not
significantly related to the soft dollar commission implying that although previous results
suggest that the advisers pay higher premium to favored brokers for additional services obtained
through soft dollar arrangements; this is partially the result of the higher degree of soft dollar
use.
As the results above indicate, the adjusted performance of the fund is positively related to
the quality of information, suggesting that the soft dollar arrangements are not homogeneous.
The impact of the quality of information obtained through soft dollar arrangements on fund
management is not limited to its positive effect on the performance. The results in Table 6
indicate that the quality of the additional services and information (LNPERTR, proxy for the
quality of additional services) obtained through soft dollar arrangements leads to lower
commissions and less soft dollar use. Higher quality of additional services and information not
only reduces the necessity of soft dollar arrangements thus reducing the aggregate premium paid
for these services but also improves the effectiveness of the transactions thus reducing the
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brokerage commissions. Thus, the quality of the products and additional services obtained
through soft dollar arrangements are important elements of the adviser’s management of the
brokerage services and related contracts.
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3.6 Limitations

Results suggest neither a form of causality nor an order of the factors. Moreover, they
should be interpreted carefully and not be taken as rejection of any alternative theory. For
example, although Carhart (1997) documents that more than half of the annual excess return
could be explained by the 4-Factor model and transaction costs describe most of the unexplained
mutual fund performance, the fund performance could be affected by various factors such as
individual manager skills.
Although, Heckmann test suggests no selection bias, some the results have to be
interpreted carefully. The direct relation between the performance and soft dollar use is a good
example. It is possible that funds that experience superior performance are likely to use
additional services more effectively and are more likely to disclose information about the details
of soft dollar use. Similarly, negative relation between the advisory fee and the soft dollar should
be interpreted carefully. Several variables are introduced in order to control for the factors
effective on the advisory fee, yet there could be some unaccounted factors. For example, the
study does not fully capture the possible effect of the adviser’s marginal product. Any
uncaptured difference between marginal products of the advisers could be partially responsible
for the variation of the advisory fee. However, this is minimized through the use of a panel
model.
Funds disclose the aggregate amount of soft dollar but not the details on services obtained
through soft dollar arrangements and there is no uniform price determined for a specific
additional service. It is not possible to observe specifically which services are obtained through a
particular soft dollar arrangement or exact premium paid for a specific service. Therefore, I am
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unable to extend the model in order to distinguish between the effectiveness of the use of soft
dollar arrangement to obtain a particular service or investigate the net value added by
outsourcing. Moreover, it is not possible to investigate the differences of the use of soft dollar
arrangements within or between the advisers. However, in order to minimize the bias due to the
limited disclosure, I use the proportion of soft dollar commissions within the total brokerage
commissions, attempting to capture how the advisers manage the necessary aggregate brokerage
service and the degree of bundling services.
Finally, it is possible that investment management service represents something more
than simply indirect sale of information (Brennan and Chordia 1993). Although the study
provides support that shareholder wealth is not improved from soft dollar arrangements, no
conclusive statement is suggested. This would require the investigation of the net value added by
outsourcing the services and exact amount of soft dollar paid for research and information.
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3.7. Conclusion

Fund management involves determining the ex post broker participation based on ex ante
expectations. The adviser further determines the necessary total brokerage services and the scope
of additional services besides trade execution that would be obtained from participating brokers
through soft dollar arrangements. Successful management of soft dollar arrangements and
brokerage services should lead to obtaining the services at the minimum cost and strategic
engagement of additional contracts with the brokers. Under soft dollar arrangements, the adviser
outsources the services (mainly research) and the shareholders pay the cost of these services
under brokerage commissions. Therefore, in return shareholders expect to benefit from better
performance and reduction in advisory fee.
Results indicate that the determination of the broker participation by the adviser is not
arbitrary. The adviser’s considerations on broker participation are strategically reflected in the
brokerage fee and soft dollar use. The advisers ex ante determine the broker participation in
order to minimize the ex post brokerage commissions while considering soft dollar
arrangements. The advisers engage in more soft dollar use and have higher brokerage fees if they
consider research and the sale of fund shares in determining broker’s participation. However, the
soft dollar use, soft dollar fee and the brokerage commissions decrease if the adviser considers
transaction related services, such as the ability to obtain best execution price in broker’s
participation. Concentrating the brokerage service demand on certain brokerage houses leads to
lower brokerage commission but higher soft dollar fee. Moreover, such favoritism induces
advisers to engage in higher soft dollar use. Thus, the advisers enforce competition within the
brokerage industry for lower cost of transaction execution. However, the concentration of
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services on a number of brokers does not lead to similar competition for obtaining the additional
services at fairer premiums.
The soft dollar use and cost of brokerage services are not solely based on the careful
determination of the participation of broker based on the considerations of the adviser or
allocation of brokerage services among the brokers. The relations and related contracts between
the adviser and the brokers also affect the management of brokerage services. The arrangements
that allow rebalancing of rent transfer to the adviser lead to increase in brokerage commissions
and bundling of brokerage services. Furthermore, the advisers that hold securities of brokers that
derive more than 15% of the profits also have lower brokerage commissions. The results suggest
that having affiliated brokers increase both the brokerage commissions and soft dollar fee. This
suggests that the adviser engages in excess transaction execution through affiliated brokers to
retain the assets within the family and indirectly compensates affiliated brokers by rent transfer
through premiums. Neither holding securities of the brokerage houses nor having an affiliated
broker affects the soft dollar use.
I find that the increase in soft dollar use, the proportion of bundled brokerage services,
leads to better fund returns and a reduction in the gross advisory fee. Nevertheless, shareholders
bear the cost of improvement through soft dollar commissions. Overall, shareholder wealth is not
better off from soft dollar arrangements. In a brokerage industry where brokers compete for
lower cost of transaction execution as the results suggest, the undisclosed premium portion of the
soft dollar commissions paid for the additional services are likely to be responsible for this
adverse effect. Two results provide further support for this argument. First, although the
brokerage commissions decrease when the broker base is more concentrated, soft dollar fees
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increase. Second, the soft dollar fee is higher if there exists an affiliated broker although the
results suggest that the fund does not obtain higher soft dollar use. As the SEC notes in its 1995
report “Soft dollar practices also diminish the ability of a client to evaluate the expense it incurs
in obtaining portfolio management services and may hinder the ability of the client to negotiate
fee arrangements.” Hence, the disclosure of the details of soft dollar arrangements could
encourage the competition to provide these services at fairer prices to shareholders.
Overall, concentration of the broker base and the scope of services the adviser considers
in determining the broker base affect the soft dollar use. Transaction based services lead to less
soft dollar use while soft dollar use increases if research and sale is a consideration.
Reimbursement of commissions leads to increase in both the soft dollar use and the aggregate
cost of brokerage services whereas the existence of affiliated broker leads to only increase of
commissions. Shareholders benefit from higher degree of soft dollar use but detriment from the
cost incurred. Results suggest that the undisclosed premium of the additional services is
responsible for this adverse effect.
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TABLES
Table 13 Descriptive Statistics

Variables

N

Mean

Med.

25th

75th

Soft $ / Total Brokerage

SDU

1583

0.51

0.37

0.10

0.87

Advisory Fee (basis points)

WADVb

1787

79.19

75.87

60.94

94.22

Brokerage Fee (basis points)

BRKFb

1738

40.85

22.16

12.65

45.16

Adjusted Return

FFAR

1761

-0.67%

-1.42%

-7.72%

5.06%

Fund Size ($ million)

WFUND

1761

161.36

167.39

47.30

541.61

Turnover

TO

1790

320.78%

199.62%

121.15%

319.80%

Brokerage Concentration

BRHERF

1845

0.07

0.04

0.03

0.07

Adviser Size ($ million)

ADVSZ

1817

16011.30

17908.84

3291.01

69410.96

Number of Accounts (thous.)

NUMACC

1666

5053.32

7973.51

1278.50

34909.00

% Reimbursement

REIM

1662

0.18%

0.01%

0.00%

0.11%

Objective Concentration

OBHERF

1757

22.09

24.26

16.95

28.33

FE load+12b-1 (basis pts.)

ALTCOMP

1626

17.01

0.1

0.00

14.55

soft $ / TNA (basis pts.)

SOFTFEE

1612

20.73

7.67

2.07

21.89

$ Transaction per soft $

PERTR

1161

738.20

590.29

442.14

780.66
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Table 14 Descriptive Statistics of Broker Base Characteristics and the Frequency of the Considerations on
Broker Participation

Variables

N

1

0

Hold sec. of brokers

BRSTC

1774

39.97%

60.03%

Affiliated broker

AFFI

1801

28.54%

71.46%

Arrange. to return comm.

CRED

1795

29.86%

70.14%

Sales of fund shares

SALES

1795

31.98%

68.02%

Research and information

RES

1796

88.08%

11.92%

Receipt of quote & valuation

QUO

1795

27.69%

72.31%

Obtain best price for execu.

EXE

1795

97.21%

2.79%

Telephone or wire service

TEL

1795

8.25%

91.75%
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Table 15 Panel Model Regressions of Brokerage Commissions and Soft Dollar Commissions
Dependent variable for first model is brokerage fee, for the second model soft dollar use. Independent variables are
respectively, fund size, fund turnover, BRHERF brokerage concentration, BRSTCK fund holds securities of brokers
that derives more than 15% of the profits, AFFI dummy variable equal to 1 if an affiliated broker exists, CRED is
equal to one if there is an agreement to return all or part of the commissions. Dummy variables are equal to one if
following factor is a factor in broker participation. SALES for sale of fund, QUO for quote and valuation service,
EXE for obtaining best execution price, COM for telephone or wire service, RES for research and information
providing. ALTCOMP is the percentage of total dollar front end load and dollar 12b-1 fee paid solely to brokers.
INT, SC and SP are objective dummies for international, small company and specialized funds.
Soft Dollar Use
Soft Dollar Fee
Aggregate Brokerage
Variables
Soft $ Commission
Soft $ Commission
Brokerage
Brokerage Commissions
TNA
TNA
LNWFUND
TURN
BRHERF
BRSTC
AFFI
CRED
SALES
QUO
EXE
COM
RES
ALTCOMP
INT
SC
SP
ONE
R2
Number of Funds

0.009
(0.14)
-0.01***
(0.00)
0.16**
(0.04)
0.02
(0.17)
0.02
(0.42)
0.07***
(0.00)
0.03**
(0.05)
0.03
(0.20)
-0.16***
(0.00)
-0.14***
(0.00)
0.09***
(0.00)
1.6E-04
(0.30)
0.02
(0.57)
-0.11**
(0.03)
0.22***
(0.00)
0.36***
(0.00)
0.28
390

-1.61**
(0.02)
2.39***
(0.00)
17.17*
(0.06)
-0.14
(0.93)
5.68**
(0.02)
7.08***
(0.00)
-4.50***
(0.00)
0.32
(0.89)
-37.32***
(0.00)
-1.32
(0.71)
12.65***
(0.00)
0.04**
(0.02)
9.00**
(0.03)
-1.15
(0.82)
-2.85
(0.50)
52.03***
(0.00)
0.25
401

***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. p values are given in parenthesis.
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-4.41***
(0.00)
10.25***
(0.00)
-73.78***
(0.00)
-5.93**
(0.04)
9.06**
(0.02)
9.81***
(0.01)
-9.90***
(0.00)
1.43
(0.70)
-40.74***
(0.00)
-4.25
(0.46)
15.84***
(0.00)
4.0E-03
(0.88)
22.73***
(0.00)
19.14***
(0.01)
-18.37***
(0.00)
92.93***
(0.00)
0.54
403

Table 16 Panel Regression of Adjusted Fund Returns and Soft Dollar Use
Dependent variable is Fama-French 4 factor adjusted returns. Independent variables are SDUHAT fitted values of
soft dollar use, LNPERTR natural log of dollar value of transaction per soft dollar commission in order to capture
the quality of information, TRCOST is the brokerage commission to turnover fund once, lagged fund size, fund
turnover and fund dummies.
Dependent Variable : Adjusted Fund Return
Model 1
Model 2
0.14***
0.22***
SDUHAT
(0.00)
(0.00)

Model 3
0.18***
(0.01)

SOFTFEE

-0.08***

-0.01
(0.69)
-0.05***
(0.00)
-0.03
(0.17)
-0.16**

-006

(0.00)
0.02
371

(0.02)
0.05
275

(0.00)
0.05
275

(0.23)
0.01
379

(0.12)
0.05
283

LNWFUND(T-1)
TURN
SC
INT
SP

R
Number of Funds

-3.5E-04***
(0.00)
0.02***
(0.00)
-0.001
(0.78)
-0.002
(0.61)
-6.3E-04
(0.62)
-0.005
(0.81)
-0.04***
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.60)
-0.20***

0.02***
(0.00)
-0.005
(0.27)
-0.003
(0.50)

TRCOST

2

Model 5

-3.2E-04**
(0.03)
0.02*
(0.07)
-3.67E-04
(0.93)
-5.8E-04
(0.90)
-0.002*
(0.09)
-0.02
(0.26)
-0.04***
(0.01)
0.04***
(0.00)
-0.10

LNPERTR

ONE

Model 4

***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. p values are given in parenthesis.
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Table 17 Panel Regression of Advisory Fee and Soft Dollar Use
Dependent variable is the gross advisory fee divided by fund size. SOFTFEE is the percent of assets paid as soft
dollar commission. SDUHAT is the fitted values of soft dollar use. LNWFUND NATURAL LOG OF FUND SIZE,
TURN is fund turnover, LNSPSZ is sponsor size, LNACCOU natural log of number of shareholder accounts,
REIMBURS reimbursement divided by fund size, OBHERF objective concentration and fund dummies for
international, small cap and specialized funds.
Dependent Variable: Advisory Fee (basis points)
Model 1
Model 2
-39.06***
-30.11***
SDUHAT
(0.00)
(0.01)
SOFTFEE
LNWFUND

Model 3
-25.52**
(0.02)

Model 4

Model 5

0.18***
(0.00)

0.07***
(0.01)
-4.09***
(0.00)
0.79***
(0.00)
-3.55***
(0.00)
2.81***
(0.00)
-0.02**
(0.03)
0.03
(0.76)
18.06***
(0.00)
14.59***
(0.00)
-5.08
(0.16)
129.60***
(0.00)
0.22
371

-4.48***
(0.00)

TURN
LNSPSZ
LNACCOU
REIMBURS
OBHERF
INT
SC
SP
ONE
R2
Number of Funds

96.94***
(0.00)
0.04
390

-4.34***
(0.00)
1.33***
(0.00)
-0.004
(0.73)
0.06
(0.60)
21.55***
(0.00)
9.19**
(0.05)
11.04***
(0.01)
114.54***
(0.00)
0.18
361

-4.03***
(0.00)
3.27***
(0.00)
-0.02*
(0.095)
0.05
(0.64)
19.79***
(0.00)
9.82**
(0.03)
5.21
(0.20)
148.55***
(0.00)
0.20
361

***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. p values are given in parenthesis.
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76.13***
(0.00)
0.10
410

Table 18 Panel Model Regressions for Further Tests
Variables are the same as in Table 3. SDU is the soft dollar use, LNPERTR is the natural log of transaction per
commission of soft dollar.
Soft Dollar Use
Soft Dollar Fee
Brokerage Fee
Variables
Soft $ Commission
Soft $ Commission
Brokerage Commission
Brokerage Commissions
TNA
TNA
44.05***
SDU
(0.00)
-0.07***
-9.00***
-14.88***
LNPERTR
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.01**
-1.57***
-1.89
LNWFUND
(0.03)
(0.00)
(0.11)
-0.006***
2.11***
11.25***
TURN
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.003
4.16
-121.26***
BRHERF
(0.98)
(0.61)
(0.00)
-0.02
-0.45
-6.43*
BRSTC
(0.33)
(0.76)
(0.08)
0.04
1.37
11.81**
AFFI
(0.19)
(0.53)
(0.02)
0.09***
1.66
15.21***
CRED
(0.00)
(0.42)
(0.00)
0.05***
-5.41***
-12.72***
SALES
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.05**
-0.76
0.53
QUO
(0.03)
(0.72)
(0.91)
-0.16***
-30.62***
-30.71***
EXE
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.17***
6.63**
-0.52
COM
(0.00)
(0.04)
(0.93)
0.06*
8.19***
13.24**
RES
(0.08)
(0.00)
(0.05)
3.04E-04
0.03**
0.01
ALTCOMP
(0.19)
(0.02)
(0.83)
0.03
10.15***
20.69***
INT
(0.43)
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.15***
6.21
9.81
SC
(0.01)
(0.15)
(0.25)
0.17***
-4.15
-27.23***
SP
(0.00)
(0.25)
(0.00)
0.83***
31.58***
149.14***
ONE
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.68
0.39
0.62
R2
295
390
298
Number of Funds
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. p values are given in parenthesis.
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CONCLUSION
I study corporate governance of equity mutual funds in a framework of relations between
the three closely interrelated actors of mutual fund industry. The mutual fund advisers, the
shareholders and the mutual fund board being the advocate of shareholders rights.
The advisory fee, price of professional portfolio management provided by the mutual
fund adviser depends not only on the fund characteristics but also on the fund objective, the
adviser’s portfolio related and management based decisions, and the portfolio performance.
Furthermore, the advisory fee which is solely an outcome of the negotiations between the fund
board and the adviser, thus a good proxy for the governance skills of the board. Advisers may
reduce their own costs through the use of derivatives or manipulate the actual fee contract by
engaging in soft dollar agreements. Advisers actively manage the advisory fee contracts
responding to the outcome of their management decisions such as voluntary fee reimbursement
or non-reimbursements. Risk taking behavior is the main motivation behind the structure of
advisory contracts. Also, I show that non-surviving funds have higher advisory fees, suggesting
competitive fee pricing may be necessary for survival.
The individual characteristics of the members that occupy board seats are crucial for
mutual fund board governance. I find that boards benchmark objective average fee but not
necessarily for the best interest of shareholders. Shareholders are likely to benefit from the
expertise of members with higher tenure and finance backgrounds. Although increase in board
independence is likely to contribute to board governance, the effect of 2000 regulation change of
board independence on its arguably target group is limited. Nominating committee improves the
board governance. Although the results do not suggest that an independent chairman directly
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improves board governance, I find modest evidence that the impact of an independent chairman
is likely to depend on the expertise of the member that would occupy the chairman seat.
Soft dollar arrangements which are found to be reducing the advisory fee are unique in
the sense that they are joint product of board and adviser and directly affect the overall wealth of
shareholders. Fund advisers determine the broker base, scope of brokerage services and whether
to self produce or outsource brokerage services through soft dollar arrangements. In return,
shareholders expect to benefit from better fund performance and reduction in advisory fee. I find
that transaction execution not necessarily motivated by additional brokerage services is likely to
be responsible for high turnover. Construction of brokerage base by the adviser is not arbitrary.
Advisers ex ante construct the broker base in order to minimize the brokerage commissions and
considering ex post soft dollar arrangements. Transaction execution related services lead to less
brokerage commissions and soft dollar use while both increase if research is a consideration for
broker participation. More concentrated broker base leads to lower brokerage fee and higher soft
dollar use. Results indicate that advisers enforce competition within brokerage industry for lower
cost of transaction execution. Shareholders benefit from increasing soft dollar use through
performance improvement and reduction in advisory fee. Yet, the cost of soft dollar
arrangements seems to exceed their benefit to shareholders. If the results indicate competition
within brokerage industry for lower cost of transaction execution, the undisclosed premium paid
for the additional services are likely to be responsible for this adverse effect.

117

REFERENCES
Almazan, Andres, Keith C. Brown, Murray Carlson and David A. Chapman, 2004, Why
constrain your mutual fund manager?, Journal of Financial Economics 73, 289-321
Ambachtsheer, Keith P., 1993, The soft dollar question: What is the answer?, Financial Analysts
Journal 49, 8-10
Baker Malcolm and Paul A. Gompers, 2003, The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial
Public Offering. Journal of Law & Economics 46, 569-598
Beasley, M. S. 1996, An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director
composition and financial statement fraud, The Accounting Review 71, 433-465
Bebchuk, L., Fried, J. and Walker D., 2002, Managerial power and rent extraction in the design
of compensation. University of Chicago Law Review 69, 751-846
Bergstresser Daniel, John Chalmers and Peter Tufano, 2004, Assessing the cost and benefit of
brokers: A preliminary analysis of the mutual fund industry, unpublished manuscript
Berkowitz, S. A., D. E. Logue and E. A. Noser Jr., 1988, The total cost of transactions on the
NYSE, Journal of Finance 43, 97-112
Blume Marshall E., 1993, Soft dollars and the brokerage industry, Financial Analysts Journal 49,
36-44
Booth James and D. Deli, 1999, On Executives of Financial Institutions as Outside Directors,
Journal of Corporate Finance 5, 227-250
Brennan Michael J. and Tarun Chordia, 1993, Brokerage commission schedules, Journal of
Finance 48, 1379-1402
Brickley James A., Jeffrey L. Coles and Rory L. Terry, 1994; Outside directors and the adoption
of poison pills, Journal of Financial Economics 35, 371-390.
Brickley, J., Jeffrey L. Coles, J., Jarrell, G., 1997, Leadership structure: separating the CEO and
chairman of the board, Journal of Corporate Finance 3, 189-220.
Brown Keith, W. Harlow and Laura Starks, 1996, Of tournament and temptations: an analysis of
managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry, Journal of Finance 51, 85-110
Byrd John and Kent A. Hickman, 1992; Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from
tender offer bids, Journal of Financial Economics 32, 195-221
Carhart Mark M., 1997, On persistence in mutual fund performance, Journal of Finance 52, 5782
118

Chan, L. K. C. and J. Lakonishok, 1993, Institutional trades and intraday stock price behavior,
Journal of Financial Economics 33, 173-199
Chen, Joseph, Harrison Hong, Ming Huang and Jeffrey Kubik, 2004, Does fund size erode
mutual fund performance? The role of liquidity and organization, American Economic
Review 94, 1276-1302
Christoffersen Susan E. K., 2001, Why do money fund managers voluntarily waive their fees?,
Journal of Finance 56, 1117-1140
Christoffersen S., R. Evans, D. Musto, 2005, The economics of mutual fund brokerage: Evidence
from the cross section of investment channels, unpublished manuscript
Conrad Jennifer S., Kevin M. Johnson and Sunil Wahal, 2001, Institutional trading and soft
dollars, Journal of Finance 61, 397-416
Dalton, D. R., C.M. Daily J.L. Johnson and A.E. Ellstand, 1999, Number of directors and
financial performance: a meta-analysis, Academy of Management Journal 42, 674-686
Del Guercio Diane, Larry Y. Dann, M. Megan Partch, 2003, Governance and board of directors
in closed-end investment companies, Journal of Financial Economics 69, 111-152
Deli Daniel N., 2002, Mutual fund advisory contracts: An empirical investigation, Journal of
Finance 57, 109-133
Deli Daniel N. and Varma Raj, 2002, Contracting in the investment management industry:
evidence from mutual funds, Journal of Financial Economics 63, 79-98
Droms William G.and David A. Walker, 1994, Investment performance of international mutual
funds, Journal of Financial Research 17, 1-14
Edelen Roger M., 1999, Investor flows and the assessed performance of open-end Mutual funds,
Journal of Financial Economics 1999, 439-466
Eisenberg T. S., S. Sundgren and M. Wells, 1998, Larger board size and decreasing firm value in
small firms, Journal of Financial Economics 48, 35-54
Elton Edward J., Martin J. Gruber, Sanjiv Das and Matthew Hlavka, 1993, Efficiency with costly
information: A reinterpretation of evidence from managed portfolios, Review of
Financial Studies 6, 1-22
Elton, E., Gruber M., and Blake C., 2003, Incentive fees and mutual funds, Journal of Finance
58, 779-804
Fortin Rich and Stuart Michelson, 1996, What mutual funds really return after taxes, Journal of
Financial Planning 9, 60-65

119

Freeman John P. and Stewart L. Brown, 2001, Mutual fund advisory fees: The cost of conflicts
of interest, The Journal of Corporation Law 26, 609-673.
Granger C. and P. Newbold, 1974, Spurious regression in econometrics, Journal of Econometrics
2, 111-120
Grinblatt Mark and Sheridan Titman, 1994, A study of monthly mutual fund returns and
performance evaluation techniques, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 29,
419-445
Gruber Martin J., 1996, Another Puzzle: The growth In actively managed mutual funds, Journal
of Finance 51, 783-810
Horan Stephen and D. Bruce Johnsen, 2004, Does soft dollar brokerage benefit portfolio
investors: Agency problem or solution? unpublished manuscript, George Mason
University School of Law, 2004, 1-34
Ippolito Richard A., 1989, Efficiency with costly information: A study of mutual fund
performance, 1965-1984, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 1-23
Ippolito Richard A., 1992, Consumer reaction to measures of poor quality: Evidence from the
mutual fund industry, Journal of Law and Economics 35, 35-70
Jensen, Michael, 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control
systems, Journal of Finance 48, 831-880
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency cost, and capital structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360
Keim D. B. and A. Madhavan, 1998, The cost of institutional equity trades, Financial Analysts
Journal, July/August 50-69
Kesner, I.F., 1998, Directors’ characteristics and committee membership: an investigation of
type, occupation, tenure, and gender, Academy of Management Journal 31, 66-84
Khorana Ajay and Henri Servaes, 1999, Determinants of mutual fund starts, Review of Financial
Studies 12, 1043-1074.
Khorana Ajay, 2001, Performance changes following top management turnover: Evidence from
open-end mutual funds, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36, 371-393
Khorana Ajay, Peter Tufano and L. Wedge, 2005, Board structure, mergers and shareholders
wealth: A study of mutual fund industry, unpublished manuscript, Georgia Institute of
Technology
Klein April, 1998, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, Journal of Law and
Economics 41, 137-165.
120

Koski Jennifer L. and Jeffrey Pointiff, 1999, How are derivatives used? Evidence from the
mutual fund industry, Journal of Finance 54, 791-816
Kuhnen Camelis M., 2005a, Dynamic Contracting in The Mutual Fund Industry, unpublished
manuscript, Stanford Graduate School of Business
Kuhnen Camelia M., 2005b, Social networks, corporate governance and contracting in the
mutual fund industry, unpublished manuscript, Stanford Graduate School of Business
LaPlante Michele, 2001, Influences and trends in mutual fund expense ratios, Journal of
Financial Research 24, 45-63.
Latzko David A., 1999, Economies of scale in mutual fund administration, Journal of Financial
Research 22, 331-339.
Latzko David A., 2004, Mutual fund expenses, unpublished manuscript,
Lipton M. and J. Lorsch, 1992, A modest proposal for improved corporate governance, The
Business Lawyer 48, 59-77
Livingstone Miles and Edward S. O’Neal, 1996, Mutual fund brokerage commissions, Journal of
Financial Research 19, 273-292
Livne Gilad and Brett Trueman, 2002, The impact of soft dollars on market equilibrium and
investors’ profits, unpublished manuscript, LBS and UC Berkeley
Luo Guo Ying, 2002, Mutual fund fee-setting, market structure and mark-ups, Economica 69,
245-271
Malhotra D.K. and Robert W. McLeod, 1997, An empirical analysis of mutual fund expenses,
Journal of Financial Research 20, 175-190
McLeod R and D. Malhotra, 1994, A re-examination of the effect of 12b-1 plans on mutual fund
expense ratios, Journal of Financial Research 17, 231-240
Morck R., A. Schleifer and R. W. Vishny, 1988, Management ownership and market valuation:
An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315
Murphy Kevin, 1998, Executive compensation, working paper, University of Southern California
Neter, J., Wasserman, W. and Kutner, M. H. 1985. Applied linear statistical models (Second
edition). Homewood, IL: Irwin
Perry, Todd, 2000, Incentive compensation for outside directors, unpublished manuscript,
Arizona State University

121

Rea John D., Brian K. Reid and Kimberlee W.Millar, 1999, Operating expense ratios, assets, and
economies of scale in equity mutual funds, Investment Company Institute Perspective 5,
1-15
Ryan Jr. Harley E. and Roy A. Wiggins III, 2004, Who is in whose pocket? Director
compensation, board independence, and barrier to effective monitoring, Journal of
Financial Economics 73, 497-524
SEC, 1995, Disclosure by investment advisers regarding soft dollar practices, Washington D.C.
Release No. 34-35375
SEC, 1998, Inspection report on the soft dollar practices of broker-dealers, investment advisers
and mutual funds, http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/softdolr.htm
Security and Exchange Commission, Division of Investment Management, 2000, Report on
Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, [http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm].
Shivdasani, A. and D. Yermack, 1999. CEO involvement in the selection of new board members:
An empirical analysis, Journal of Finance 54, 1829–1854.
Sirri, E., and Tufano, P., 1998, Costly search and mutual fund flows, Journal of Finance 53,
1589-1622.
Starks Laura T., 1987, Performance incentive fees: An agency theoretical approach, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 22, 17-32
Sutton J., 1991, Sunk cost and market structure, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press
Tufano, Peter and Matthew Sevick, 1997, Board structure and fee-setting in the U.S. mutual fund
industry, Journal of Financial Economics 46, 321-355.
Vafeas Nikos, 1999, Board meeting frequency and firm performance, Journal of Financial
Economics 53, 113-142
Vance, S.C., 1983, Corporate Leadership: Boards, directors, and Strategy, McGraw-Hill, New
York
Varma Raj, 2003, An empirical examination of sponsor influence over the board of directors,
The Financial Review 38, 55-76
Warner, Jerold B. and Joanna Shuang Wu, 2005, Changes in mutual fund advisory contracts,
working paper, University of Rochester
Weisbach, M., 1988, Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics 20,
431–460.

122

Wirth Gregg, 1997, Greenwich: institutions are uncomfortable with their soft dollar
arrangements, Investment Dealers Digest, June 9, 15
Xie Biao, Wallace N. Davidson III and Peter J. DaDalt, 2003, Earnings management and
corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee, Journal of Corporate
Finance 9, 295-316
Yermack D., 1996, Higher market valuation of companies with small board of directors, Journal
of Financial Economics 40, 185-221
Zhou Xianming, 2001, Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link
between ownership and performance: comment, Journal of Financial Economics 62, 559571

123

